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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 14407 
WALTER E. MULLINS, 
Plaintiff-respondent, 
<-vs-
RALPH M. EVANS, and ROYAL 
INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, INC., 
a California corporation, 
Defendants-appellants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff-respondent to obtain a 
two percent (2%) commission payment from Ralph M. Evans, an indivi-
dual, and Royal Industries Corporation, Inc., a foreign corporation. 
Plaintiff-Mullinsf claim is based on a written letter memorandum 
signed by Ralph M. Evans, President of the R. M. Evans Company, 
an Arizona corporation, and concerned a machine owned and produced 
by the R. M. Evans Manufacturing Corporation, an Arizona corpora-
tion. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The plaintiff-Mullins' Complaint for a two percent (2%) 
commission against the two defendant-appellants originally prayed 
for relief under the terms of a written contract. This Complaint was 
dismissed, with leave to amend, because it stated no claim against 
these defendant-appellants. Thereafter, plaintiff-Mullins filed 
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an Amended Compla in t p r a y i n g f o r r e l i e f u n d e r t h e t e r m s o f an 
a l l e g e d o r a l c o n t r a c t o b l i g a t i n g t h e s e d e f e n d a n t - a p p e l l a n t s . 
P l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s was p e r m i t t e d a j u r y t r i a l on t h e b a s i s of t h i s 
Amended C o m p l a i n t . 
T h e r e a f t e r , a t t r i a l , even though p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s 
a d m i t t e d t h a t h i s c l a i m was b a s e d on t h e w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t , t h e t r i a l 
j u d g e p e r m i t t e d t h e c a s e t o go t o t h e j u r y . A v e r d i c t was r e t u r n e d 
i n t h e sum of $ 6 , 0 4 0 . 0 0 a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t - R a l p h M. Evans as an 
i n d i v i d u a l , and t h e sum of $ 4 7 , 1 6 0 . 0 0 a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t - R o y a l 
I n d u s t r i e s C o r p o r a t i o n , I n c . 
The t r i a l j u d g e had become i l l and was h o s p i t a l i z e d p r i o r 
t o t h e c a s e h a v i n g been s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y o r j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s 
h a v i n g been p r e p a r e d and r e a d . F u r t h e r , a d e a t h i n t h e j u d g e ' s 
f a m i l y d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of t h e t r i a l p r e v e n t e d a d e q u a t e and a p p r o -
p r i a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s by t h e C o u r t . However, 
upon t h e j u d g e ' s r e t u r n t o t h e b e n c h , he n o n e t h e l e s s d e n i e d d e f e n -
d a n t s - a p p e l l a n t s 1 Motion f o r a Judgment N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e V e r d i c t , 
i n t h e A l t e r n a t i v e , f o r a New T r i a l , o r f o r a R e m i t t i t u r on t h e 
J u d g m e n t . Thus , t h i s v e r d i c t was p e r m i t t e d t o s t a n d and d e f e n d a n t s -
a p p e l l a n t s a p p e a l e d . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The d e f e n d a n t s , Ralph M. E v a n s , an i n d i v i d u a l , and t h e 
Royal I n d u s t r i e s C o r p o r a t i o n , I n c . , s e e k t o have t h e v e r d i c t r e v e r -
s e d and remanded w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r a d i s m i s s a l a g a i n s t each of 
them. I n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , each d e f e n d a n t - a p p e l l a n t s e e k s t h i s 
C o u r t t o o r d e r a new t r i a l o r a r e m i t t i t u r . 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiff-respondent, demonstrates the following facts: 
1. P la in t i f f - respondent , Walter E. Mullins, (hereinaf ter 
refer red to as "pla in t i f f -Mul l ins") i s a maintenance man for 
Chicago Bridge and Iron Company. He had no engineering t r a in ing , 
did not hold himself out to be an engineer, and had completed 
the 11th grade in h i s schooling. (R-474, 486-487; A-3) 
2. P la in t i f f -Mul l ins denied having done any engineering 
on the machine, subject of the within l i t i g a t i o n ; he c lear ly and 
heatedly made t h i s point as follows: 
"A. Le t ' s get t h i s s t r a i g h t , r i g h t to s t a r t 
with; there was no 'engineer1 in t h i s . I am jus t a maintenance man—no ' eng inee r ' . I don ' t 
know where t h i s came from--get i t s t r a i g h t be-
fore the Court, r i g h t now; there i s no 'engineer ' 
in t h i s . " (R-522; see also R-548, 828-829; A-3, 
36; see also A-62, 217-218.) 
3. In approximately 196 5, p la in t i f f -Mul l ins began bu i ld -
ing a post forming machine for EFCO Corporation, a company of which 
defendant-Evans was then Pres ident . This machine i s not par t of 
the within l i t i g a t i o n , but es tab l i shed a format of the p a r t i e s ' 
subsequent business deal ings . This format was t h a t the f i r s t 
machine prototype was constructed by p la in t i f f -Mul l ins at home on 
an hourly b a s i s , during h is spare time. Subsequently, the machines 
were b u i l t on a fixed fee b a s i s . (R-487-488, 523-524, 559, 842; 
A-4, 37-38, 71, 226). P la in t i f f -Mul l ins invoiced and was paid by 
EFCO as ear ly as December 20, 1965. (R-842, 844; A-228). 
4. The defendant-Evans formed two (2) Arizona corpora-
t i o n s . One corporation was a manufacturing organization 
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known as the Ralph Evans Manufacturing Corporations and the second 
was one for sa les of the manufactured goods; i t was cal led R. M. 
Evans Company, Inc . These corporations superceeded the EFCO 
Corporat ion 's r e l a t ionsh ip with p la in t i f f -Mul l ins and h is produc-
t i on . (A-40, 41; Exhibi t D-l; A-53.) 
5. In the spring of 1966, defendant-Evans informed 
p la in t i f f -Mul l ins of a new machine concept for laminating p l a s t i c 
to ki tchen countertops by a device which operated s imi la r ly to the 
wringer r o l l e r s on an old s ty l e clothes washing machine; however, 
in t h i s case the r o l l e r s were much la rger and the bottom r o l l e r was 
segmented. This segmented bottom r o l l e r permitted the segments to 
be l a t t e r a l l y separated as to permit the uneven port ions (backsplash 
board, e t c . ) of the kitchen countertop to pass through, while main-
ta in ing constant pressure on the p l a s t i c as i t was being laminated 
to the countertop. (A-55-57.) 
6. P la in t i f f -Mul l ins agreed to attempt t o construct a 
prototype machine embodying the machine concept on an hourly r a t e 
in h i s spare time at home. (R-53 3, 566; A-47, 78.) After the f i r s t 
prototypes were constructed, p la in t i f f -Mul l ins agreed t o construct 
and ship the machines on a fixed fee bas is of $42 5.00 per machine, 
which agreement was consummated in November, 1966. (R-570; A-83) 
Invoices for labor form p la in t i f f -Mul l ins on the f i r s t machines are 
not pa r t of t h i s s u i t ; however, of s ignif icance i s the fact tha t 
a l l invoices of p l a in t i f f -Mul l in s , for h i s services above described, 
were addressed to and paid for by the R. M. Evans Manufacturing 
Corporation, a f te r January 28, 1966. (R-846, 862; A-229, 239.) 
7. After P la in t i f f -Mul l ins had constructed 
a number of these postforming machines at h is home, 
1 -am^v /^->v* •hv r^'-f- Q wo-r^ n r n v i H^rl h v f h p R. M. E v a n s 
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Manufacturing Company a t a premises l o c a t e d in Murray, Utah. 
P l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s only furn i shed p e r s o n a l s e r v i c e s and a l l of 
the b i l l s , i n c l u d i n g t h e r e n t and u t i l i t i e s , were pa id by s a i d 
c o r p o r a t i o n . (R-491; A-7.) F u r t h e r , a l l m a t e r i a l s and supply 
cos t s were pa id by t h e R. M. Evans Manufacturing Company, I n c . , 
e i t h e r by b i l l i n g s submi t ted by p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s , or by invo ices 
forwarded t o the c o r p o r a t i o n ' s Glendale , Arizona h e a d q u a r t e r s . 
(R-491, 537-538, 569, 575; A-7, 51 , 81, 87) 
8. At l e a s t by January 28, 1966, p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s was 
f u l l y aware t h a t he was d e a l i n g wi th the Ralph M. Evans Manufactur-
ing Corpora t ion , an Arizona c o r p o r a t i o n . (R-568-570, 613, 583; 
A-80-82, 116, 95.) P l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s acknowledged t h i s f ac t by 
add res s ing correspondence to the ffR. M. Evans Manufacturing Com-
pany, A t t e n t i o n Ralph M. Evans.11 (R-583; A-95.) 
9. Before any machines were s o l d o r produced and i n 
e a r l y 1966, p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s made p r e l i m i n a r y drawings which were 
forwarded t o t h e Ralph Evans Manufacturing Company. P l a i n t i f f -
Mull ins i n h i s own hand wrote the t i t l e : "R. M. Evans Manufacturing 
Company" on t h e s e drawings . (R-572, 613-614; A-84, 116-117; 
E x h i b i t D-18.) In a d d i t i o n , dur ing 1966 p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s : (a) 
Was pa id by co rpora t ion checks, (R-536, 567; A-50, 79) ; (b) B i l l e d 
and invo iced the Ralph M. Evans Manufacturing Company, I n c . , when 
seeking payment fo r work completed, (R-537-538, 846; A-51-52, 228); 
(c) Pur suan t t o i n s t r u c t i o n s r ece ived from the c o r p o r a t i o n , caused 
s u p p l i e r s to b i l l the Ralph M. Evans Manufacturing Company, r a t h e r 
than Mr. Evans p e r s o n a l l y , (R-537, 567; A-51, 79 ) ; (d) Addressed 
a l l correspondence to t h a t co rpo ra t e e n t i t y , (R569,575,851; A81,232) . 
- 5 -
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10. The f i r s t machine known as t h e "Evans EZY-BOND 
PINCH ROLLER" was completed and shipped by p l a i n t i f f -Mul l ins Nov-
ember 28, 1966. (R-862; A-238) This machine and a l l subsequent 
ones had i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t ags p laced on them by p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s . 
These i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t a g s s t a t e d : "R. M. Evans & Co. I n c . , 
P a t e n t Pend ing . " (R-602, 618, 621 , 866-867; A-109, 119-120, 240-
241; E x h i b i t D-30.) 
11. In March of 196 7, a d i s p u t e a rose between p l a i n t i f f -
Mul l ins and the Ralph M. Evans Manufacturing Company concerning 
q u a l i t y c o n t r o l and d e l i v e r y problems. P l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s informed 
the c o r p o r a t i o n p r e s i d e n t , defendant -Evans , t h a t i f he thought i t 
was so ea sy , he could t a k e the p roduc t ion t o Phoenix , Ar izona . 
This s u g g e s t i o n was accep ted ; however, p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s a s s e r t e d 
an ownership i n t e r e s t in the machine and re fused t o s u r r e n d e r t h e 
p a r t s , j i g s , dogs, p a r t i a l l y completed work, and o t h e r r e l a t e d 
m a t e r i a l s . (R-502-503; A-18-19•) P l a i n t i f f Mul l ins demanded 
$10,000.00 cash for h i s a s s e r t e d p r o p r i e t o r y r i g h t s in t h i s machine, 
now known as t h e "Evans EZY-BOND PINCH ROLLER." (R-504; A-20) . 
12. P l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s was informed by defendant-Evans t h a t 
t h e r e was no money in t h e co rpo ra t i on t o pay t h e $10,000.00; how-
e v e r , defendant-Evans o f f e r e d t o pay f ive p e r c e n t (5%) of the ne t 
income of t h e R. M. Evans Company for one yea r and two p e r c e n t (2%) 
of the manufactur ing c o r p o r a t i o n ' s s a l e s p r i c e of t h e "EZY-BOND 
PINCH ROLLER" as long as i t made t h e machines, i f p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s 
would s u r r e n d e r t h e machine p a r t s , j i g s and p a r t i a l l y completed 
machines . In a d d i t i o n , t h e c o r p o r a t i o n pa id $18,613.90 for work 
done by Mull ins between Ju ly 1966 and March 20, 196 7, t h e 
l a s t da t e work was done. (R-870; A-239-240.) 
m"U ^ ^***mn-mA r-> o. A r\-*\ o/-Tfv»/~n»"m^yk 4- T.T =a e a /-*• r*a> f\ +• O A 
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(R-503, 862-863; A-19, 238-240.) However, p la in t i f f -Mul l ins 
required tha t any such agreement would have to be reduced to a 
wr i t ing . (R-504-505; A-20-21.) 
13. On or about March 24, 196 7, the terms were reduced 
to a wri t ten memorandum. P la in t i f f -Mul l in s ' own testimony of th i s 
arrangement was as follows: * 
"A. I was asking for $10,000.00 for the 
sett lement on t h a t Pinch-Roller, so he 
could have a l l the r igh ts to the machine." 
"Q. What did Mr. Evans say? No response 
to tha t?" 
"A. He sa id , 'Walt, I can ' t afford t h a t ; 
I'm jus t ge t t ing s t a r t ed—sta r t ed in 
business — and I owe you qui te a b i t of 
money; and when I get i t paid off, and when 
I get i t paid off, and—I can ' t afford t h a t , 
but I w i l l do t h i s ; I wi l l give you two 
percent (2%) of the s e l l i n g cost of tha t 
machine, as long as I bui ld i t . 1 " 
"Q. On the sa les p r i ce , you mean?" 
"A. Yes." 
"Q. What was your response to t h i s sugges-
t ion?" 
"A. I to ld him that i t sounded l i ke a f a i r 
and honest agreement, and if he would put i t 
into wr i t ing , I would agree to i t . " 
"Q. Did he, subsequently, send you a wri t ing 
to t h a t e f fec t?" 
"A. Yes, he d id ." (R-504-505; A-20-21.) 
That wr i t ing was received by p la in t i f f -Mul l ins and s t a t ed as 
follows: 
"Dear Walt: 
"In reference to our conversation of March 24, 
196 7 regarding your commissions on the EVANS 
EZY-BOND pinch r o l l e r s a l e s , (sic) 
- 7 -
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"As agreed, we wi l l pay you a two-percent (2%) 
commission on a l l EVANS EZY-BOND pinch r o l l e r s 
manufactured in Glendale, Arizona. This com-
mission to be based on the Mfg. Co. sa le p r ice 
of the pinch r o l l e r or $1,165.00 per machine. . . . 
11 
. . . 
it 
. . . 
"Very t r u ly yours, 
"R. M. Evans and Co. , Inc . 
Ralph M. Evans, Pres ident . " (R-505; A-21-22, Exhibit 
D-3, attached as Appendix "A".) 
(Counsel for p la in t i f f -Mul l ins s t i pu l a t ed tha t the five percent 
(5%) of the p ro f i t s of the R. M. Evans Manufacturing Company was 
ful ly paid and not an i ssue in th i s s u i t . ) (R-590, 593-594; A-102.) 
14. P la in t i f f -Mul l ins also t e s t i f i e d tha t h is commission 
was to be two percent (2%) " . . . o f the sa les p r i ce , based on 
$1,165.00, sa les p r i c e . " (R-596; A-104.) Further , p la in t i f f -Mul l ins 
s t a t ed spec i f i ca l ly tha t the two percent would be paid only "as 
long as he (R. M. Evans and Co.) manufactured them." (R-597; A-104.) 
15. P la in t i f f -Mul l ins permitted agents of the Manufact-
uring Corporation to take a number of uncompleted machines, the 
j igs and other devices used in the construction of the machines to 
Phoenix for manufacture. (R-59 8; A-105-106.) 
16. As s t a t ed above, p la in t i f f -Mul l ins was not an engineer 
and made no claim of performing engineering work. In h is deposi-
t ion taken December 21, 1970, and read in to the record, p l a i n t i f f -
Mullins submitted tha t he did not design the features of the machine; 
he s t a t ed : 
"Q. But are you t e l l i n g me you did not 
design features of that machine?" 
"A. No, I d idn f t design them." 
" . . . any design features of the Ezy-Bond machine 
sole lv vour ideas?" 
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"A. I s a y , p o s s i b l y , t h e frame a s p e c t , you 
know, and t h e o u t e r frame and s h e ] ] , " 
" Q . what p a r t do you b e l i e v e i s o r i g i n a l wxtii 
you?" 
1
 W e l l , I j u s t designed—-I mean, I s h a p e d 
tru shape of i t , you know—how i t was s h a p e d , 
about t h e o n l y thincj I can s r v . " 
"Q Was t h e r e anyth ing e l s e in the Ezy-Bond 
machine which you r e g a r d as o n - m a I ,-J i th you 
o r y o u r i d e a ? " 
, r«5S2: A-66.) 
Therea f t er a\ - r \ ,i I
 f k j ^ i ^ t i r f -Mul l i ns dj ••• a s s e r t t h a t tit.- r i g i n a t e d 
t .1 l e :i d e a i ' • > -1 * ] iii 1 : 1 • • i 
man's body was cauytu , *.n ni i-. i d e a ; he a l s o t e s t i f i e d t l lat he s e l e c • 
t e d rnater i al s f o r and des i gned t h e s q u a r e d r i v e s h a f t f o r the b o t t o m 
s egmente d i: o 1 ] e r and de s i gn e d th e p 1 a t e f rame. (R- 5 4 8; 1 \ 6 2 ) 
] 7 P1 a i n t i f f - Mu 11 i n s a dini 11 e d t h a t th i s s a f e t y d e v i c e 
was cons tin i c t e d by goi ng t o Mr Ra] pi i Wal ker o f a pnei mat :ii c si rppl y 
h o u s e . I t was Mr. Walker who drew t h e pneumatic c i r c u i t and recom-
mended t h e s t o c k p a r t s t h a t won] d be r e q u i r e d t o r a i s e the r o l l e r s , 
w h e i i a s a f e ty b a r w a s p r e s s e d • I " ] a i i I t i f f Mu ] ] :ii i i s * 
b e i n g p a i d on an h o u r l y r a t e . (R-566; A-78 . ) Tha t cir< ,. ;ys tem 
a n c j t j i e s a f e t y d e v i c e c o n c e p t was n o t una qi l e , new o r nov* rhe 
c o n c e p t was p a t e n t e d f i r s t i n 1 95 8 and w as pan I of tlio - - -: r- -. Ln , 
(R-651-652 , 658 , 779, 782; A-132- ] 33 , 135 , 194 , 1 96; E x h i b i t : L-?3) 
A l s o , p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s admit ted t l l a t t h e segmen ted TO±L^± con'.*/1 ' 
was n o t h i s , b u t someone e l s e " / , However, t h e s q u a r e d r i v e sha i : t 
d e s i g n was h i s (R-828, 830; A - 2 1 7 - 2 1 8 , 
] 8 u i 1 < )i .1 Mc i: - 1 , J 9 6 ; , . . ^ . t ;- - ; . ; ; ,;•;: 
i nformed by the Evans Manufacturing Company from Arizona . -r; " J -
culties which were occurring with the machine due iw uneven piessure 
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being applied on the kitchen tops . (R-584; A-96; Exhibit D-28.) 
P la in t i f f -Mul l ins accepted r e spons ib i l i t y for the square shaft 
design and the r e su l t ing d i f f i cu l ty with customers of the machine. 
(R-589; A-101.) Some th i r ty -one (31) machines constructed by p l a i n -
t i f f -Mul l ins had to be redesigned for a round drive shaft and m i l l -
ing of the rubber r o l l e r s . Also, other customer complaints received 
by the manufacturing corporation were forwarded to p la in t i f f -Mul l ins , 
(R-881, 883; A-254, 256.) 
19. The square shaft concept of p la in t i f f -Mul l ins was 
abandoned between May and June, 196 7, because redesign and correc-
t i o n a l e f for t s on t ha t system were not successful . (R-79 7, 879, 
881; A-203, 252, 254.) 
20. On or about August 23, 196 8, a l e t t e r was forwarded 
to p la in t i f f -Mul l ins by the R. M. Evans Company, signed by defendant 
Evans as Pres ident . This l e t t e r enclosed a corporate check in the 
sum of $1,182.78, as fu l l payment for a l l amounts due or the reaf te r 
due to p l a in t i f f -Mul l in s ; i t also out l ined how the figure was 
arr ived a t , by deducting adjustments for defective square shaft 
machine r e p a i r s . The l e t t e r s t a t ed in pa r t : 
"I honestly f ee l , Walt, t ha t you have been well 
paid for any design and development e f for t s 
which you put in to the Ezy-Bond and do not feel 
further payment to you on t h i s machine i s j u s t i -
f ied . Therefore, ef fect ive May 1, 196 8, we wi l l 
no longer pay you commissions on each Ezy-Bond 
manufactured. Very t ru ly yours, R. M. Evans and 
Company, I n c . , Ralph M. Evans, Pres iden t . " 
(R-50 8; A-2 4; Exhibit D-4, attached as Appendix 
"B".) 
21 . This l e t t e r was received by p l a i n t i f f-Mullins; i t was 
read and understood by him to be a tender by the company of a l l 
sums due t o p l a i n t i f f-Mullins . The check was knowingly endorsed, 
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c a s h e d <- i r • " I M J ^ js.°d by n l . a i n t i f f-Mu M n ^ . ^ - i ; / S - h -'<;> 
d u - : t - o n *-.-: *^'r t h ! - r \ ' *.::• *. d e f e c t i v e - q u a i e d r i v e f.-h ; * -~*\vriines 
( R - 8 7 8 ; A-".'c 
n o r aL..,*: SeptemiDe^ . *,. „ , , . . . - . : : . . . . *s 
a d d r e s s e d n l e t t e r J ^ t h e P I ' IV.^H c o m p a n y . I n 4 l :';i 
d e n c e he d i d n o t d i s p u t e tt< I O M J - I UI.M :--•-• i M . a t t on Lena,- :^ i -^ ; • / 
•'- •* r i ^ on "t f o r p o r a t i " * r /.- t~ n** r . ^ ' - - I P I s ' v** •': • ^ * i i - f lette r r ^ n i I ^ S T e d 
.: , . - • ••/: • -; i e i: :i I: s p o s :I t i • :)i 1; I: :t, c . - - " 11 :i ] oo k -
i n g a t t h i s fro^i my s n i - f don : y ^ \ U-t-1 . u -\^>\.lc. c o n t i n u e wi t l i 
o u r a g r e e m e n t ? 1 • v " \ : E,xhJi -r 
2 3 . * , . • . * >*- t e n d e r e d . i.: . r * i^ 
money received; rather h.o negotiated* the - .uc*-k even thouc'i -:e * .3 
* 3 S J i ; 
s h a f t d e s i g n e d . i-io'nn* '.viiioh \v MLOV, ^ a s .wt ' -o rKing a n a .. is - . b -
s e q u e n t l y scrapper: - :-'M-
p i a i r - t i f f - lu > - M - , : r ^ ••'• 1. i T t d U v a q r e e n 1 i i a t s a i d M a i l : . 
p r o d u c e J-^ •*-';-•- ~ , w i r ^ t a b l e m a c h i n e . . . " ( R - 5 ^ 
The r e d r s i . j . .- .. {.he R a l p h M. E v a n s Manufa ". i r : : , 1 om-
pany r e o u l r c ! "u . A d d i t i o n a l c o s t s o f $1 6 0 , 0 0 p e r machir: . . * ! , *:M 
o f $ 4 , 9 - ' 1: 1 add :i til 01 1. • -
s i 11:11 • :)f .,.v i i a n c ^ i . a u o . u s t r a v e l and v ^ i d t e a e x p e n s e s 
t o t a l i n g $4, f5G' ! W P D 3 n m r n - d , f?i.h,-f i a - m e d l o s s e s i 1: ic] 1 i d e d 
< - r e d i t s g i • - . ' • • : . ,: u: 1 :l < 1 ] o s s • : • Il: I! \ \ • = 1 1 l b ; 
customers it .. -:•-<;-; o- -4 j . • ... i-ot.u t'-s-'. testiti ;- *_< 
defendant-Lvans by virut 01 uic breach 01 uixo understandinu tu 
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the Manufacturing Corporation was approximately $49,593.00. 
(R-884, 891; A-257, 264.) As above s t a t ed , the defendant agreed 
to a deduction of the two percent commission on the th i r ty -one (31) 
defective machines and accepted r e spons ib i l i t y the re for . (See also 
R-892; A-265.) 
25. Immediately pjrior to December 31, 196 8, the defendant-
Royal Indus t r ies Corporation, Inc . began negot iat ions for the pur-
chase of the assets of the two Arizona corporat ions, Ralph Evans 
Company, Inc . and the R. M. Evans Manufacturing Company. They 
employed an independant c e r t i f i e d publ ic accountant firm to audit 
the asse ts and l i a b i l i t i e s of the two corporat ions . After such an 
audi t , a contract was consummated dated December 31, 196 8. This 
contract provided tha t they would purchase the assets of these two 
corporations and t r ans fe r approximately 50,000 shares of investment 
stock to the stockholders as payment, plus assume designated and 
spec i f i ca l ly enumerated l i a b i l i t i e s attached as an Exhibit t o t ha t 
wr i t t en cont rac t . (R-808, 909, 911, 916, 919, 926; A-210, 273, 275, 
278-279, 281, 284; Exhibit D-45.) This contract fur ther provided 
tha t the law of Cal i fornia would apply t o the t r ansac t ion . (Exhibit 
D-45.) 
26. The named l i a b i l i t i e s to be assumed by defendant-
Royal I ndus t r i e s , did not include the contingent claim of Walter 
Mullins; in fac t , sa id defendant-corporation was not even aware of 
the exis tence of p la in t i f f -Mul l ins f asser ted claim u n t i l subsequent 
to the f i l i ng of th i s s u i t on August 10, 1970. (R-2; R-916, 910-
911, 918; A-278, 274-275, 280.) 
27. At the close of p l a i n t i f f ' s case, the only evidence 
concerning the number of machines produced was the e igh ty- three (83) 
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mach ines which had been m a n u f a c t u r e d p r i o r t o t h e t i m e t h a t t h e 
a s s e t ' s nit ihc i w<> Ar\ zona romifhitnoh h.nl I r i MIIII i ipfetm Kin I 
Royal I n d u s t r i e s . The t e i o r e , t h e d e f e n d a i i i s each moved l o r a d i s -
m i s s a l on the; q rounds t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f had f a i l e d t o moot h i s 
HuuMtMi ill i MI I fin es f ab 1 r hi in, I'liiini aq-unsi. t h e s e d e f e n d a n t . . 
"The ("oulii took t h e s e m o t i o n s under a d v i s e m e n t and fo r ced t h e d e f e n -
d a n t s t o p r e s e n t t h e i r a f f i r m a t i v e e a s o , ( R-Q,>n ; A-2 81-2 R /, ) 
T'ho f oaf t e i , ov idoneo Wii.'i [> t tMJ» »n 1 oi I hy the d e i e n d a n t s t o e s t a b l i s h 
t h a t a maximum of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 46 3 machines : i ^J ooen prc r ; ; r f< of 
whioh 83 had a1 ready been p a i d f o r , ] * 
cl l i n e s upon .-) i c h pi a i n t i f f -Mu] 1 i ns ecu M. i a ^ - » J m .- . 
damages i\ J 7 2 , 991 ? A- 294 , 302 . ) 1 s i i r c l P i P ^ r H; a ^ ^ o u n t i n g made 
L 
number p roduced was V* maoninr *-*t*\r \- i ic* ' >- , i« 
p l i e s t h a t p - - ^ T ^ i - * ~i! *--nr.- ( \23.3u *-' - - . . -
. i ; 4 „ i a , i u i j j o oi,itv; j-i .L .ji. as p ^ r i .i ^ i J L uv-11 .Jvj j eecue• *,t) * 
*:< " e s u l t if" 30,1 **'. >j , rhi j- 'uw - -it ..dxinun anw^r , 
v e r d . 4 * h 
c o u l o puSSLbi_y nave bet-n r e i i d^ i fu a g a i n s t uiv uarL\ , ^ven 
p r o p e r p a r t i e s d e f e n d a n t - R . M, Evans M a n u f a c t u r i n g c o r p o r a t i o n o r 
Ralph 'Evans C< D m p a n y ( I I ] 0 6 3 ) • • . .' 
2 8 . On t h e 1 a s t day of t h e t r i a] (Thur sday , June 26 , 1 975),. 
a member of t h e t r i a l j u d g e ' s famj ] y di ed and , t h e r e f o r e , the 
j udge :i  i ifoi: med i: .1 v = 1 .1 ic I • :ii i. = I ::» I :i i s i leed to make f u n e r a ] a r r a n g e -
m e n t s , t h e j u d g e woui. i 10 1 onge r be a b l e t o hai i d l e t h e c a s e ; t h e r e -
f o r e , he would be iefr - r i n g t h e m a t t e r t \ge Ha ] ] Tl n t, = , I he 
j u r y was e x c u s e d ui*f Monday, J i me 30, . • (R-976 ; A-297-298 . ) 
2 9 . P r i o r ] e a v i n g Cour t Thur- i-v r , >e ?»-'.. ; Judge 
S n o w < r •  i I 1 e < i I: .1 ; f f "' s c : o i n i s e ] an d . • • 
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his chambers, indiv idual ly and separa te ly , and t r i e d to induce the 
p a r t i e s t o reach an accommodated se t t lement , ind ica t ing (at l e a s t 
to defendant) t ha t i f the case were not s e t t l e d , the case ' s jury 
in s t ruc t ions would be prepared by Judge Hall on Friday, June 2 7, 
19 75. Negotiat ions fa i l ed and arrangements for Judge Hall did not 
work out . (A-318) In the meantime, Judge Snow was confined in the 
LDS Hospital and he apparently attempted to put together the jury 
i n s t r u c t i o n s , while confined in the h o s p i t a l . (A-319) The judge 
noted: "That i s a thing I t r i e d to stay out of, tha t damned hospi-
t a l . I went to the point I couldn ' t stand up." (A-319) 
30. On Monday, June 30, 1975, at 9:00, Judge Croft made 
himself available to read the jury instructions prepared by the 
trial judge, Marcellus K* Snow; however, there were obviously im-
proper instructions and counsel were referred to Judge Snow at the 
I^ DS Hospital. Counsel for thq defendants arrived for the appointed 
hour of 1:00, however, due to some problem in finding parking, 
counsel for plaintiff did not arrive until approximately 1:30 
o'clpck. After the judge was injected with medication, counsel 
met with the t r i a l judge from approximately 1:30 u n t i l 3:00 p.m. and 
discussed the problems with the jury i n s t ruc t i ons ; however, a l l 
p a r t i e s were under considerable time pressure because the jury had 
been to ld t o report back at 2:30 o'clock p.m. to receive the in s t ruc -
t ions in the case. (R-979, 1040-1043; A-299, 318-321.) The t r i a l 
j\idge s t a t e d , concerning t h i s session and the objections to the 
jury in s t ruc t ions a t a subsequent argument to vacate the verd ic t : 
"No quest ion, everybody was in a hurry to get to i t . " (R-1043; A-32X) 
31. The jury had been in recess for over three and a 
half (3 1/2) days before the jury in s t ruc t ions were f ina l ly read to 
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t h e m s o m e t : -^ - i r : t ^ r ^: * '-Mori- . :i Monday , J u n e 3 0 , 1 9 7 5 , (R-
] 0 43, • i i • 3! - . . . . . . .
 3 
d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e : • - IL . - ' a ^ e d e ] . ; \ " ' a u s e d i \*.- . , ' 
b ecome a g g r a v a t e d a n d , on a t 1 e a s t c*r O ^ - J S ^ ^ , n r e c i n j * - •-
j u r o r t o s t a t e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u i , r ^ . 
l a w y e r s who a r e I n t r o u b l e . " T h i s s t a t e m e n t was a p p a r e n t ; . , made 
b e cai i s e s h s \ / a s \ i nab ] e t o m e e t 1 l e r d a t e be cai i s e of ^ r •*- i t s c h e d -
u l i n g , ( R - 1 0 4 4 ; A - 3 2 2 . ) 
3 2 . I n d e f en d an t ' s co un s e 1 ' s c 3 o s i n g a r g ume n t t o t h e 
• xtpi i t e d t .1 le d a m a g e s 1 le 'was s e e k :i i lg : 1 le t o o k 
*•.••"' e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i i M i :^ n amber of R H P : \:,a* p r o d u c e d c rr. . i 
- * .- --•. by $ 4 0 , - ; u i e r e b , r v u ~ u i ' f *" r v, ^ : ~4 - r e s p o n d e n t , 
c o u n s e l p r a y e d a maximum r e a - ,. i1. , ) 
3 3 , The lUr1 c o u l ' : remember *J:-~ n u m b e r ot ' ^ c h i ' ^.; 
p r o d u c e d arid r o q u e s ^ - ' ^^ •*• a 
d u r i n g t h e i r d e l i b e r a t i o n s * .-h^r* i\ b e f o ? • i. ± In. . h t \ ^ i -
t h e j u r y r e t u r n e d w.i < *"" -ov-Hi .<•-»- • + >,. c:UIr r i ? 6 , 0 4 P • V-MJ r s t 
K a 1 p 11 M. tis ' a.r i :• > § p e i " : * i. i' 
I n d u s t r i e s , - I n c . A r f i - j d v i t s i i i d i : u c f , - ' i r " a r r i \ v • , ; 
v e r d i c t by s p e c u l a t i n q t h a t a t ^ i - " j h i n e s h a d b e e n p u r -
c h a s e d and. inu L t : i p l i e d t h a t t i gu i • • ; •, * - ^ p a c h mach i n e . 
( R- 4 3 6 , 4 52 ; A - 4 0 2 , 3 6 0 , 3 3'?. ) 
Subsequent" , mot: i o n s lie; •.--.-:•---^ -r * ": - - •. :d-me: * , r u i d. new 
t r i a l , o r lioi u t;emi t t i t u r oL !..*--• judgmcni . t c - ron iorm t o t h e e v i d e n c e 
w e r e d e n i e d by t r i a l c o u r t , ( R - 3 9 2 ; A - 3 3 6 . ) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE EXISTS NO FACTS UPON WHICH TO BASE A JURY VERDICT 
AGAINST RALPH M. EVANS, AN INDIVIDUAL. 
A. THE RULING OF THE LAW AND MOTION JUDGE THAT THE 
WRITING DID NOT OBLIGATE THESE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS MAY NOT BE 
OVERRULED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE; THEREFORE, THE ADMISSION AT TRIAL BY 
THE PLAINTIFF-MULLINS THAT THERE WAS NO ORAL AGREEMENT REQUIRED 
THAT DEFENDANT-RESPONDENTS1 MOTION TO DISMISS BE GRANTED. 
As s t a t e d i n t h e D i s p o s i t i o n i n L o w e r C o u r t S t a t e m e n t , 
t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t f i l e d b y t h e p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s a s s e r t e d a 
w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t b i n d i n g t h e t w o named d e f e n d a n t - a p p e l l a n t s . T h a t 
c o m p l a i n t w a s d i s m i s s e d b e c a u s e t h e w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t , s u b j e c t o f 
t h e s u i t , r a n s o l e l y t o t w o A r i z o n a c o r p o r a t i o n s w h i c h w e r e n o t 
p a r t i e s t o t h e l i t i g a t i o n . ( R - 2 - 3 , 1 4 9 ; A-59 8 . ) The p l a i n t i f f -
M u l l i n s , w a s , h o w e v e r , p e r m i t t e d t o amend h i s c o m p l a i n t , a n d t h e r e -
a f t e r , a l l e g e d t h a t an " o r a l c o n t r a c t " p e r s o n a l l y o b l i g a t e d d e f e n -
d a n t - E v a n s . T h a t Amended C o m p l a i n t a l l e g e d : 
"The p l a i n t i f f , f o r c a u s e o f a c t i o n a g a i n s t 
d e f e n d a n t s , a n d e a c h o f t h e m , a l l e g e s a s 
f o l l o w s : 
" 1 
-L. . . . . 
"2. That plaintiff entered into an oral con-
tract with the defendant, Ralph M. Evans, where-
in the defendant, Ralph M. Evans, was to pay two 
percent (2%) commission on all Evans Ezy-Bond 
Pinch Roller machine"s~"to be manufactured by defen-
dant, Ralph M, Evans, ..." (emphasis added) (See 
Amended Complaint, R-147; A-404.) 
However, at trial, plaintiff-Mullins unequivocally denied 
any oral understanding by stating that any oral statements had to be 
reduced to a writing. He said of the oral discussion concerning 
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commission: 
" Q. (C ut le r) Wh at w as your res p on s e 1: .o til: 1 at 
s ug ges t i on (2 % commis s i on)? 
"A. ( M u l l i n s ) i t o l d him t h a t sounded l i k e a 
f a i r and h o n e s t a g r e e m e n t , and , i f he would p u t 
i n w r i t i n g , I would a g r e e t o i t , " 
h i t l e r Did *:o * : usecner . f l y , s e n d you a 
w r i t i n * * - a t e f f o r t ; ' 
>c • 
' ,•.. l a l l i r u . <" d i d , xn j l - i t P - 3 , 
a t t a c h e d i s Appendi> was s *- i e.J. i f i e d 
as t h a t w r i t i n g and r e c e i v e d .r. j VJ " tenet . ) 
( R - 5 0 4 - 5 0 5 ; A-20 -21 . ) 
rJ .. aareemen+- c o n c e r n , ; , ' • * p e r c e n t commission was l i m i t e d i n 
t ; ' ? w r i t i n g ( a n : ; \ t h e 'iv.il u s / a p s ^ n c c n c e r n i n . •' i-- - ^ c h i n e s 
i -f • 5 ' :•.- , - r e -
duced » e s t a b l i s h , . / .rd agreement ^ p - e v i d e n c e t o £-'r:\* any 
m a n u f a c t u r e d H r defendant -Fv-in • r- ^ <=-*>; ^ a r c h e r , t h e wri * t sn 
memorandum .-? -.?*':"< ; : • ^ • • , - . ..:. l ower Cour t as 
c r e a t i ng only ••% corporate oh 1 i uar i on ; t h e r r fore
 t i t u r a n t e ' l * d i smi s -
s a l i n defendant -Kv *.-•. : ' : 
h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y iie ,LG LiiciL uu».: jyi.sLi.LcL Juu^e j.b w i t h o u t •- ".-*r r ..) 
o v e r r u l e t h e D e c i s i o n of a n o t h e r D i s t r i c t J udge . I t ha s s u c c i n c t l y 
o b s e r ;redi 
" G e n e r a l l y , one D i s t r i c t Judge c a n n o t o v e r r u l e 
a n o t h e r a c t i n g D i s t r i c t Judge h a v i n g i d e n t i c a l 
a u t h o r i t y and s t a t u r e . We s u b s c r i b e t o such a 
s a l u t o r y p r i n c i p l e . " S t a t e v, Morgan, 527 P . 2 d 
22 5 , 226 (Utah 19 7 4 ) ; P e t e r s o n v . P e t e r s o n , 530 
P. 2 - fi?1 (Utah 19 7 4 ) . 
T .. ^ i ' O i . .; ; . L , was e v v o r t o 
f a i l uo d i s m i s s • • c l a i m a g a i n s t Defendan4 - t v a n s . The p l a i n t i f f -
Mul : : ' c l a i m u i an - ni ,md III: .i : lowar 
Cou. : . nn power +-^  ,v«.LLui.t . -? .^JILI..*
 ; , ad^ruent awarded 
defendan t -E -a: I f %' ' t r t^n ^ n t r ^ - * - ?,>.».«. Such ai i 
o r der was f i n a l and u i n d i n g Abs ei 11 oi i Ai >pe a 1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND ADMISSIONS OF PLAINTIFF-
MULL INS AND HIS COUNSEL DEMONSTRATE THAT PLAINTIFF-MULLINS f CLAIM 
IS BASED SOLELY ON A CORPORATE OBLIGATION RUNNING ONLY TO TWO 
ARIZONA CORPORATIONS, NOT PARTIES TO THIS LITIGATION. 
As t h e c a s e was p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l / t h e p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s 
a d m i t t e d t h a t he had done b u s i n e s s , n o t w i t h Ralph M. Evans as an 
i n d i v i d u a l ; r a t h e r , h i s d e a l i n g s h a d f i r s t been w i t h a c o r p o r a t i o n 
known as EFCO. T h e r e a f t e r , he had done b u s i n e s s f o r t h e R. M. Evans 
M a n u f a c t u r i n g Company, I n q . , an A r i z o n a c o r p o r a t i o n , ( S t a t e m e n t o f 
F a c t N o s . 7 - 9 . ) T h i s t e s t i m o n y of Mr. M u l l i n s was augmented by 
e v e r y p i e c e of p h y s i c a l and documenta ry e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d . Fo r 
e x a m p l e , t h e p r e l i m i n a r y d r a w i n g s f o r t h e m a c h i n e , s u b j e c t of t h e 
c l a i m e d commiss ion i n t h i s s u i t we re made i n t h e S p r i n g of 1966 and 
p r i o r t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e f i r s t p r o t o t y p e m a c h i n e . I n p l a i n -
t i f f ' s own h a n d w r i t i n g , t h e p l a n s were i d e n t i f i e d as b e l o n g i n g t o 
t h e : "Ralph M. Evans M a n u f a c t u r i n g Company, I n c . " (See E x h i b i t D-18) 
F u r t h e r , e v e r y b i l l i n g f o r payment by p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s 
was a d d r e s s e d t p t h e c o r p o r a t i o n a t i t s A r i z o n a a d d r e s s . ( S t a t e m e n t 
of F a c t No. 7; E x h i b i t s D-10, 1 1 , 1 3 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 2 0 , 2 3 , 3 5 , 4 2 . ) 
Every payment r e c e i v e d by Mr. M u l l i n s was p a i d by a c o r p o r a t e e n t i t y ; 
he h a d been r e c e i v i n g payment from t h i s A r i z o n a c o r p o r a t i o n f o r more 
t h a n one y e a r p r i o r t o t h e l e t t e r ag reemen t of A p r i l , 196 7 . ( E x h i b i t 
D-14; S t a t e m e n t of F a c t No. 6 . ) In a d d i t i o n , p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s was 
( p u r s u a n t t o i n s t r u c t i o n from t h e c o r p o r a t i o n ) , d i r e c t e d t o have e v e r y 
s u p p l i e r of m a t e r i a l s and p a r t s b i l l t h e c o r p o r a t i o n , which t h e y d i d 
a t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n . ( S t a t e m e n t of Fact; No. 7; See I n v o i c e E x h i b i t s , 
S u p r a . ) These f a c t s a r e f u r t h e r i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e f o l l o w i n g 
c o l l o q u y : 
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11Q (cu11 e r ) We 1 ] , :i sn ' t i t 11 ue , Mr. Mu 11 i n s , 
t h a t as of May 1966 , you had r e c e i v e d i n f o r m a -
t i o n t o change y o u r b i l l i n g s p r o c e d u r e s , and 
i n f a c t you changed t h o s e as e v i d e n c e d by b i l l i n g s 
you s e n t ? " 
f
 t I , (Mull i n s ) I d o n ' t r e c a l l t h i s , b u t i t 
coil I d be t r u e . " 
1
 Q. (Cutler) You testified yesterday, if my mem-
ory is correct, that you received information, 
from time to time, from the Evans Company concern-
ing billing, and you relayed that information to 
your suppliers?" 
""
 ,TrJ la t is true " (A 80) , 
P l a i n t : -~ .. = t h e n c a n d i d l y a d m i t t e d : 
, „
 % u t l e r ) Mr, M u l l i n s , i s i t n o t c o r r e c t t h a t 
a l l of y o u r b i l l i n g s went t o t h e c o m p a n i e s , and " 
e v e r y payment you r e c e i v e d o v e r t h i s e n t i r e p e r i o d , 
came from a c o r p o r a t e e n t i t y ? " 
"A. ( M u l l i n s ) To my b e s t r e c o l l e c t i o n , y e s . , 
(A-82) ( emphas i s added) 
A 1 s 11, o ve ry • : o i i: e s p oi I de i i c e b e t:w ee i i til I e p a i: t I< • .  - - . *..~ > •.> i . ; r e s s e d 
by p i a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s t o t h e c o r p o r a t i o n , a t t e n t i o n Ralph E v a n s , 
P r e s i d e n t , o it: sen t by t:I: Ie c o r p o r a t i on t o f • ] a :i * " s and 
s i g n e d by t h e c o r p o r a t i o n , by i t s P res ide . ! i t :. EXII . IDIL&: P - 3 , P - 4 , 
D 6, D-26, D-27, D-4] , D--43; S t a t e m e n t of Fac~ Nr-
t i m e s p l a i n t i Lf-Mull i us wat- aoaLin-.j w] tin ;
 sa ..\ck»rs tood !>*> was ..;^a* 
• M fl >:i t~h c o r p o r a t e e n t i t i e s •: e - <'v~ s cm t»- H~.-^
 (.w---n-~^ r. . •• .,. -v,*, 
Evans n e v e r p e r s o n a l l y made a m a c h i n e . i v i s f a r t i s aemoa^r ra t f • i 
t h e f o i l o w i n g c o l J oq uyi 
"Q. ( C u t l e r ) . . . d i d he (Ralph M. Evans) e v e r 
m a n u f a c t u r e a m a c h i n e , p e r s o n a l l y , on h i s own 
b e h a l f ? „ -
•
 ,!
""' i i , (I l u l l i n s ) Nt,. i . , 
A-1 10 - ] 1 1) (emphas i s added) 
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The tes t imony of p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s was a l so c l e a r and undisputed 
t h a t he o r i g i n a l l y wanted $10,000 cash for h i s a l l e g e d p r o p r i e t a r y 
i n t e r e s t in t he machine known as t h e EZY-BOND PINCH ROLLER. When 
t h a t sum could n o t be p a i d , because t h e manufac tur ing company was 
j u s t g e t t i n g s t a r t e d , h i s t es t imony was as fo l lows : 
"Q. (Cut ler ) You t o l d him you wanted $10,000, 
and he t o l d you the company d i d n ' t have any 
money?" 
"A. (Mullins) T h a t ' s r i g h t . " (R-596; A-104.) 
(emphasis added) 
T h e r e a f t e r , in o rde r to ob t a in the m a t e r i a l s and machines in p r o c e s s , 
and o the rwi se t r a n s f e r the p roduc t ion of the EZY-BOND Pinch Ro l l i ng 
machine t o Phoenix, a c o n t r a c t was n e g o t i a t e d which c a l l e d f o r : 
(a) A 5% commission on t h e Ralph M. Evans Manufacturing Company, 
I n c . for a one-year p e r i o d , ending March 3 1 , 1967; and (b) A two 
p e r c e n t (2%) commission on t h e EZY-BOND Pinch Ro l l i ng machine manu-
f a c t u r e d in Glenda le , which commission was t o be based on the " . . . 
Mfg. Co. s a l e p r i c e of the Pinch R o l l e r o r $1,165 pe r machine ." 
(Exh ib i t D-3 p r i n t e d as Appendix "A") (emphasis added) This l e t t e r 
was s i g n e d : 
"R. M. Evans and Company, I n c . , Ralph M. 
Evans, P r e s i d e n t . " (emphasis added) 
P l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s confirmed t h e s e f ac t s in h i s own o r a l t es t imony 
and s t a t e d : 
"Q. (Cut ler ) Then, he sugges ted , as I 
unders tand your t e s t imony , 'How about 
t a k i n g two p e r c e n t — ' . " 
"A. (Mullins) That i s t r u e . " 
"Q. (Cut ler ) Of the Company, or— — ? " 
"A. (Mullins) The s a l e p r i c e of the machine ." 
"Q. — -^of t h e s a l e p r i c e , based on $1,165 
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"A. (Mullins) T h a t f s r i g h t . " (R-596; A-104) 
The e n t i r e r eco rd demonst ra tes t h a t s i n c e l a t e 1965 
(almost a yea r p r i o r t o t h e Apr i l 196 7 memorandum con t r ac t ) t h e 
p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s d e a l t e x c l u s i v e l y and s o l e l y wi th co rpo ra t e 
e n t i t i e s , of which Mr. Evans served as an o f f i c e r . Never d id Mr. 
Evans p e r s o n a l l y agree o r , p e r s o n a l l y , o b l i g a t e h imsel f t o p l a i n t i f f -
M u l l i n s . Even t h e j u ry answers t o s p e c i a l i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s showed 
t h a t they found t h e s e f a c t s from the ev idence . See Po in t V I n f r a . 
There e x i s t s no p l ead ings whereunder the Ralph M. Evans 
Manufacturing Company o r i t s sa l e sa rm, the R. M. Evans Company, 
I n c . are j o i n e d as p a r t i e s . N e i t h e r c o r p o r a t i o n i s a l l e g e d t o be an 
i n v a l i d , co rpo ra t e o r g a n i z a t i o n for any reason . F u r t h e r , t h e r e 
e x i s t s no p l ead ing and no evidence t o sugges t t h a t , for any reason , 
the co rpora te v e i l s of t h e s e two o r g a n i z a t i o n s should be p i e r c e d and 
i t s o f f i c e r s he ld p e r s o n a l l y l i a b l e . In s h o r t , t h e r e e x i s t s no 
evidence upon which Ralph M. Evans, as an i n d i v i d u a l , i s or may be 
he ld l i a b l e for any debt whatsoever aga in s t the p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s . 
This Court has s a i d of a v e r d i c t a g a i n s t such a c l e a r 
weight of ev idence : 
" I f i t c l e a r l y appears t h a t t h e r e has been a 
m i s c a r r i a g e of J u s t i c e because the j u ry has 
re fused to accep t c r e d i b l e , u n c o n t r a d i c t e d 
evidence where t h e r e i s no r a t i o n a l b a s i s for 
r e j e c t i n g i t , or i t i s p l a i n t o be seen t h a t 
the ju ry has ac ted under a misconcept ion of 
proven f a c t s , or has misapp l ied or d i s r ega rded 
t h e law, o r where i t appears t h a t the v e r d i c t 
was t h e r e s u l t of pa s s ion and p r e j u d i c e , i t i s 
both t h e p r e r o g a t i v e and the duty of the Court 
to s e t a s ide the v e r d i c t and g ran t a new t r i a l . " 
EFCO DISTRIBUTING INC. v. PERRIN, 17 Utah 2d 
375, 379, 412 P.2d 615 (1966). 
L ikewise , t h e v e r d i c t a g a i n s t defendant-Evans must be vaca ted as a 
m a t t e r of law o r , a t a minimum, a new t r i a l o rde r ed . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT I I 
THE VERDICT RENDERED WAS SO EXCESSIVE, EXORBITANT, AND 
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AS TO SHOW THAT IT WAS AWARDED UNDER 
INFLUENCE OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE OR BASED ON PURE SPECULATION. 
THUS, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO AWARD A 
NEW TRIAL. 
The o n l y e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l was t h a t t h e r e were 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 380 mach ines m a n u f a c t u r e d f o r which any commiss ion 
c o u l d be c l a i m e d d u e . A s u b s e q u e n t l y f i l e d a c c o u n t i n g e s t a b l i s h e d 
t h e e x a c t number t o be 3 9 3 . T h u s , u n d e r any c o m p u t a t i o n , t h e t o t a l 
damage award a l l o w a b l e u n d e r t h e e v i d e n c e was $ 9 , 1 5 6 . 9 0 ($23 .30 x 
3 9 3 ) , o r i f t h e t r i a l e v i d e n c e was u s e d , $ 8 , 9 2 3 . 9 3 ($23 .30 x 3 8 0 ) . 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y , even p l a i n t i f f ' s a b l e t r i a l c o u n s e l a c k -
nowledged t h i s f a c t . However, c o n t r a r y t o t h e e v i d e n c e , t h e t e s t i -
mony of h i s own c l i e n t , and t h e c l e a r s t a t e m e n t of t h e w r i t t e n c o n -
t r a c t , he a t t e m p t e d t o maximize h i s r e c o v e r y by u s i n g a 2% commis-
s i o n , b a s e d , on t h e r e t a i l s a l e s p r i c e of a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
Thus , i n h i s c l o s i n g a rgumen t t o t h e j u r y , he u t i l i z e d t h e e v i d e n c e 
c o n c e r n i n g t h e number o f mach ines p r o d u c e d and m u l t i p l i e d t h a t num-
b e r t i m e s $40 .00 (2% of t h e r e t a i l s a l e s p r i c e , r a t h e r t h a n 2% of 
t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g company s a l e s p r i c e , as p e r t h e e x p r e s s ag reemen t 
t e r m s ) . He, t h e r e f o r e , a r g u e d t o t h e j u r y : 
"Now, w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y a r e g e t t i n g more o r 
n o t , I d o n ' t know; b u t a t l e a s t $20,000 ( s i c ) 
p e r m a c h i n e , two p e r c e n t of t h a t , i t i s o n l y 
$40 . Bu t i f you d e d u c t t h e — t h e 83 mach ines 
t h a t t h e y p a i d t o Mr. M u l l i n s o r two which 
t h e y d i d n ' t g i v e him a commission b e c a u s e t h e y 
had t o r e p a i r t h e r o l l e r s , e i t h e r way, t h a t 
s t i l l l e a v e s you w i t h 3 80 m a c h i n e s . I f you 
t a k e an a v e r a g e s e l l i n g p r i c e from b e g i n n i n g 
t o end of $2 ,000 a p i e c e , t h a t i s $40 p e r m a c h i n e . 
A f t e r t h e y d e d u c t e d what t h e y a l r e a d y p a i d h im, 
t h e y s t i l l owed Mr. M u l l i n s $ 1 5 , 2 0 0 . Digitized by the Ho ard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Nowf i f you take the s i t ua t i on and carry i t to 
i t s log ica l conclusion, t ha t sounds l i k e a l o t 
of money and i t i s , $15,200 i s a l o t of money,.." 
Closing Argument of Mr. Lauchnor, R-991, A-302. 
(emphasis added) 
Without commenting on the propr ie ty of arguing the $40.00 
base figure contrary to the agreement, i t i s c lear there exis ted no 
evidence before the jury upon which any judgment could have been 
based which exceeded $8,927.93. This Court can take jud ic i a l knowl-
edge t h a t able t r i a l counsel, in framing his maximum request for the 
jury t o the extent of i n f l a t i n g the commission from $23.30 to $40 
(contrary to the evidence), was asking the maximum which he f e l t the 
jury could award. In the face of such undisputed and uncontradicted 
evidence, one must ask then how can a jury return a verdic t of 
$6,0 40 against Mr. Evans, plus an addi t ional $4 7,160 against t h i rd -
party foreign corporation, Royal Indus t r ies Corporation, Inc. 
Affidavits of record demonstrate that the jury could not remember the 
evidence concerning the number of machines and on two separate occa-
s ions , while impanelled, requested the Court to t e l l them the number 
of machines produced. When tha t information was not supplied and 
the hour became l a t e , they simply guessed. 
Also, how a jury could be thus so confused in engaging 
such wild speculat ion, i s b e t t e r understood from the delays and 
incredib le course of events of th i s p a r t i c u l a r t r i a l . F i r s t , i t 
appears c lear ly on the record and more c lear ly in the mind of the 
w r i t e r , the frequent and long delays in the course of the t r i a l . 
The record demonstrates frequent and excessively long breaks, which 
although scheduled for ten-minute midmorning and midafternoon breaks, 
usually extended for 30-45 minutes each. Lunch breaks, l ikewise, 
were extended. These d i f f i c u l t i e s were exaggerated when on Thursday, 
July 26, the l a s t day of the t r i a l , the judge informed the jury t ha t Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a member of h i s family had died. (R-9 76; A-29 7.) 
Thereafter , on Thursday evening, af ter the jury was 
excused, the judge attempted to induce the p a r t i e s t o s e t t l e by 
t a lk ing to each counsel p r i va t e ly ; he indicated tha t i f se t t lement 
could not be reached by the following morning, Judge Hall would be 
attempting to prepare jury ins t ruc t ions on the case. (See Statement 
of Fact No. 29.) This event was further complicated when l a t e r the 
t r i a l judge became i l l and was confined to the LDS Hospi ta l . While 
thus confined, he attempted to prepare jury in s t ruc t ions from his 
hosp i t a l bed. 
These in s t ruc t ions were so obviously defective that even 
a d i f fe ren t judge noted the merit to some of the defendant-appel lants1 
objections and suggested tha t some accomodations would have to be 
made by a mutual conference with the t r i a l judge at h is hosp i t a l 
bed. This conference was had from about 1:30 u n t i l approximately 
3:00 p.m. on Monday, June 30, 1975. The jury had reported at 10:00 
a.m. and was, thus , l e f t to cool t h e i r heels un t i l 3:00 p.m. tha t 
afternoon. Thereafter , the jury was impanelled, arguments had and 
the case presented t o them at approximately 5:00 p.m., at which time 
they were taken to lunch. They did not s t a r t de l ibera t ions un t i l 
a f t e r 6:00 p.m. (See Statement of Fact No. 30.) Thus, in addit ion 
to the long i n t e r n a l delays, i t was almost exactly four days from 
the close of the evidence u n t i l the case was submitted to the ju ry . 
The f rus t ra t ions of the jury for these inconveniences, de-
l ays , and unusual circumstances was evident to a l l . One s ing le 
female ju ror even remarked, while attempting t o phone her date , t h a t 
she knew a couple of lawyers who were in t rouble if she missed tha t 
engagement. (See Statement of Fact No. 31.) Although spoken half 
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on health and personal problems of the trial judge, which clouded 
this trial. The cumulative effect clearly prevented an impartial 
and fair hearing on the issues, as is demonstrated by this excessive 
verdict. In short, the unusual situation of this trial resulted in 
this most bizarre judgment, which exceeded by almost four times the 
plaintiff's own dreams. 
Utah Law provides: 
"There is a basic distinction between an 
insufficient or informal verdict an a 
verdict regular on its face, which awards 
inadequate damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice. Rule 59(a) (5). In the latter 
case, a new trial must be granted to correct 
the error." Langton v. International Trans-
port Inc., 491 P.2d 1211, 1215 (Utah 1974) 
(emphasis added) . 
Further, this Court has clearly said: 
"It has long been established that where the 
award is in excess of damages shown by the 
evidence it will not be permitted to stand. 
In such instances the Courts exercise their 
inherent supervisory powers over jury verdicts, 
which derive from their powers to see that 
justice is done; and make corrective orders 
necessary for tha purpose. This is done by 
the trial court, or upon failure to do so, by 
this court on appeal. BODON v. SUHRMANN, 8 Utah 
2d 42, 45, 327 P2d 826 (1958). (emphasis added); 
See also, DUFFY v, UNION PACIFIC R. CO., 118 
Utah 82, 218 P2d 1080 (1950); STAMP v. UNION PAC. 
R.R. CO., 5 Utah 2d 397, 303 P2d 279 (1956); 
MECHAM v. FOLEY, 120 Utah 416, 235 P2d 497 (1951). 
It is submitted that the admission of counsel for plain-
tiff-Mullins alone demonstrates that the verdict is excessive and 
unsupported by any evidence. Further, the bizzare events of the 
judge's hospitalization and family problems created delays and diffi-
culties which prevented a fair trial. Thus, Utah sense of justice 
and fair play demand that the verdict be vacated and a new trial 
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POINT III 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE COURT IMPROPERLY 
STATED THE LAW, WERE UNCLEAR, CONTRADICTORY AND CONFUSING TO AN 
EXTENT THAT THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANTS WERE ADVERSELY 
AFFECTED. 
A. THE COURTfS ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS 
As previously stated, the Trial Judge attempted to assem-
ble jury instructions while confined in the LDS Hospital. After 
these instructions were developed, without the benefit of discussing 
them with counsel, a brief conference was permitted at his hospital 
bedside, for something less than an hour and a half. This conference 
was under considerable time pressure because of the long delays and 
the fact that the jury had been requested to report back at 2:30 p.m. 
by the substitute trial judge. At any rate, the following illustrates 
the patently erroneous and inconsistent instructions which prejudiced 
the defendants: 
1. Instruction Number 30 
(Quoted in full in appendix) 
This instruction is patently prejudicial for the following reasons: 
(a) There existed no evidence whatsoever that Royal 
Industries Corporation, Inc. agreed to pay any commission. Rather, 
the evidence is abundantly clear and undisputed that Royal Industries 
purchased the assets of the R. M. Evans and Company, Inc., an 
Arizona corporation and had no knowledge of the claim of the plaintiff-
Mull ins until suit was filed years later. (See Statement of Fact 
No. 26.) Their agreement, by its own explicit terms, purchased only 
those assets listed and assumed only those obligations enumerated in 
that contract. (Statement of Fact No. 25; Exhibit D-45.) 
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b) The instruction makes no differentiation between 
machines which would have been manufactured prior to the acquisi-
tion by Royal Industries and those produced prior thereto. 
c) There is no reservation or credit to be given for 
machines which had been produced and paid for, contrary to the undis-
puted testimony showing that there were only 380 machines for which 
commission was claimed to be unpaid. 
2. Instruction Number 31 
"The agreement in question was drawn by 
the defendant, Ralph M. Evans, on behalf 
of R. M. Evans & Company, Inc. You are 
instructed that any ambiguities in the 
said agreement shall be resolved against 
the defendants, Ralph M. Evans and Royal 
Industries Corporation, Inc., and in 
favor of the plaintiff, Walter Mullins." 
(emphasis added) 
Objections: 
(a) The instruction acknowledges that the agreement 
on which plaintiff-respondent sued was drafted on behalf of the 
R. M. Evans and Company, Inc., an Arizona corporation, not a party 
to the suit. Utah Law does provide that a written document will be 
construed against the party who drafted it; however, when did it 
become the law that such a rule of construction applies against 
third parties who did not draft it and never knowingly assumed res-
ponsibility for it? The writer has discovered no case law to support 
this instruction. 
(b) This instruction also illustrates and reinforces 
the idea of merged identity, which permeated these instructions. 
Mr. Evans, the two Arizona corporations (not parties to this action), 
and Royal Industries are treated and referred to as one entity. 
Thus, each has been prejudiced in having a fair determination of 
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t h e i r separate individual r i g h t s . 
3. Instruction Number 32 
"Royal Industries Corporation, Inc. purchased 
the assets, including physical plant and 
equipment, of R. M. Evans & Company, Inc. 
You are instructed that Royal Industries Cor-
poration, Inc. may have acquired expressly or 
by implication all the obligations and liabil-
ities of R. M. Evans & Company, Inc. and became 
legally responsible for all agreements, contracts, 
and other obligations of the said acquired com-
pany." (emphasis added) 
Objections: 
(a) The instruction tells the jury that Royal Indus-
tries "may" have "expressly" acquired all the "obligations" of the 
R. M. Evans & Company, Inc. There is not one scintilla of evidence 
to support this instruction. Rather, the only evidence produced was 
that they assumed only those obligations expressly identified and 
attached as exhibits to the Contract of Purchase. (See Exhibit 
D-45; Statement of Fact No. 26.) 
(b) The instruction suggests that Royal Industries 
"may" have acquired the "obligations" of the R. M. Evans & Company, 
Inc. by "implication." The word "implication" is not defined; it 
is ambiguous, misleading and calls for jury speculation. By what 
legal standard is the jury to determine when one may assume the 
debts of another by "implication?" However, more prejudicially, the 
instruction, in conjunction with others, suggests (contrary to law) 
that a contract of purchase of assets by one corporation makes that 
organization automatically liable for undisclosed and unknown execu-
tory contracts and claims. 
4. Instruction Number 33 
"You are instructed that if you find from a 
preponderance of the evidence that the de-
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acquired all of the physical assets of the 
Ralph M. Evans & Company, Inc. and that the 
Royal Industries Corporation thereafter con-
tinued in business the manufacture of said 
pinch roller machine in the name of the 
Evans Division of said corporation, that said 
transaction amounted to a merger of said cor-
porations and you are further instructed that 
the defendant, Royal Industries Corporation, 
Inc., not only acquired the assets of the 
Evans Company but also acquired its liabilities 
and obligations." (emphasis added) 
Objections: 
(a) Earlier, the jury was told that Royal "may" 
have assumed the plaintiff-Mullins' commission obligation by "impli-
cation." Now it is informed that, as a matter of law, there was a 
"merger," whereunder Royal assumed the "liabilities and obligations" 
of a third corporation. 
(b) The Court here rules as a matter of law that there 
was a "merger" of Royal Industries and the R. M. Evans Company when 
Royal purchased, named and specified assets and acquired listed 
liabilities of two Arizona corporations. Further, the Court impro-
perly rules as a matter of law that Royal Industries was obligated 
to honor an executory agreement it expressly did not assume. 
Certainly, purchasing named assets and assuming 
named liabilities can, under some circumstances, create a "merger" 
between two corporations. 19 An. Jur. "Corporations" §1546. 
However, in the case before the bar the evidence was undisputed that 
the two Arizona corporations survived. (A-296) Also, the purchasing 
organization did not just substitute itself for the Arizona ones. 
Royal Industries is a public issue corporation with thousands of 
products and shareholders; it has many products which were not 
handled by the Arizona corporations. Further, neither of the 
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Arizona corporations was named as a party and p la in t i f f -Mul l ins 
introduced no evidence to show whether or not these organizat ions 
had funds to pay h i s claims. 
Rather, the record demonstrates t ha t some assets 
and claims belonging to those Arizona corporations were assigned to 
defendant-Evans as par t of t h i s l i t i g a t i o n to a s s e r t as a counter-
claim. (A-291; Exhibi t D-4 4.) Further , there was no claim of 
fraud and i t was unchallenged t h a t fu l l and f a i r considerat ion was 
given for the asse ts acquired by Royal. (A-2 79.) In fac t , the case 
law i s c lear t ha t a mere sa le of asse ts and use of the name i s not 
su f f i c i en t t o e s t ab l i sh a merger. This Court has cor rec t ly summar-
ized the law as follows: 
"As a general r u l e , a separate and d i s t i n c t 
corporation which has succeeded by a va l id 
purchase and t rans fe r to the property and 
franchise of another corporation i s not l i a -
b l e , merely by reason of succession, f o r . . . 
the general contracts of another corporat ion. 
I t i s not l i a b l e at a l l for such debts or on 
such con t rac t s , in absence of a specia l agree-
ment to pay or assume the same . . . , unless i t 
aff irmatively appears t ha t the t r a n s f e r . . . 
cons t i tu tes in fac t or law, a fraud upon c red i -
t o r s , or the circumstances at tending the crea-
t ion of the new corporat ion, and i t s succession 
to thee p r o p e r t y . . . are such as t o warrant a 
finding that i t i s in r e a l i t y a confirmation of 
the old corporat ion. ( c i t a t ions omitted) 
There i s no presumption tha t obl iga t ions are 
assumed. ( c i t a t ions omitted) L i ab i l i t y depends 
e i t h e r on fraud or assumption." Cooper v. Light 
and Power Co., 35 Utah 570, 574, 102 P.202 (1909). 
(emphasis added) 
Further , t h i s Court has s ta ted t ha t such issues are questions of fac t , 
to be resolved by the f inder -of - fac t . This point i s made c lear in 
the s imi la r case of Parker v. Telegif t I n t e rna t i ona l , I n c . , 29 Utah 
2d 87, 505 P.2d 301 (1973). Here, employees of corporation "C" 
sued corporation "A" for wages earned before "A" became involved. 
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Their claim was based on the fact that corporation "B" had purchased 
all of the stock of "C" and "A" (the defendant) had, in turn, pur-
chased all of the stock of "B"; thus, they asserted a merger theory. 
This court rejected their claim, since they had failed to convince 
the finder-of-fact; it observed: 
"The burden was upon the appellants to con-
vince the trial court (a judge sitting with-
out a jury) that the stock purchases were not 
bona fide stock deals or that such dealings 
were mergers of corporations "A" and "C". 
This they failed to do." Parker v. Telegift 
International Inc., id. at P. 302. 
In the case before the bar, there was no fraud plead nor 
proved. The evidence is unrebutted and clear that Royal did not 
assume this claimed obligation; in fact, it knew nothing of it 
until suit was filed, more than one and one half years after its 
contract of purchase of the assets of the Arizona corporations. 
(A-277-278.) At best, the plaintiff-Mullins has raised an issue 
of fact concerning "merger", which fact should have been for the 
jury to determine, not the Court to rule as a matter of law. 
5. Instruction Number 34 
"You are further instructed that a corpora-
tion can only act through its agents or 
employees. Therefore, if you find from a 
preponderance of the evidence that defendant, 
Ralph Evans, became an officer or managing 
director of the Evans Division of the defen-
dant, Royal Industries Corporation, Inc., any 
actions or conduct by Mr. Evans in the perform-
ance of his job or position with said corpor-
ation was, in fact, the conduct of the corpor-
ation and it is liable therefor." 
Objections: 
(a) The evidence presented i s c lear and unequivocal 
tha t Mr. Ralph Evans, as an individual , was acting at "arm's length" 
when he sold the assets of two Arizona corporations, of which he was 
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President, to Royal Industries. (R-915; A-278-279.) He was not 
their agent and neither he nor they considered him such. At that 
point of time, Mr. Evans was a vendor and Royal Industries was a 
wary purchaser, who even employed independent auditors to evaluate 
the financial aspects of the purchase. (Statement of Fact Nos. 
25 & 26.) 
This litigation does not and never did present an issue 
concerning the conduct of Mr. Evans as an agent or employee of Royal 
Industries after sale was consummated; therefore, the sole issue 
before the Court was Mr. Evans1 relationship to Royal Industries 
before the sale of named and listed assets of two Arizona corpora-
tions of which he was President. This instruction is totally with-
out factual basis and improperly states the law by telling the jury 
that Royal Industries is liable for Mr. Evans f dealings with the 
plaintiff-Mullins, before Mr. Evans ever accepted employment with 
Royal Industries. 
Such an instruction charges Royal Industries with and makes it a 
principal party to a contract negotiated and executed years before 
they had any dealings with Mr. Evans. In short, this creates a new 
theory of agency, whereby a principal now becomes vicariously res-
ponsible for the acts of an employee, before that employee was ever 
hired. The absurdity of that position and its prejudicial effect 
in this case is obvious. 
6. Instruction Number 35 
"If you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant, Royal Indus-
tries Corporation, Inc., knew or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have 
known of the contractual obligations flow-
ing from R. M. Evans & Company to the 
plaintiff herein, and that they, in effect, 
merged the R. M. Evans & Company into Royal 
Industries Corporation, Inc. with such know-
ledge, you should find that the defendant, 
Royal Industries Corporation is liable for 
any obligations owed to the plaintiff by 
R. M. Evans & Company." 
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Objections: 
(a) Nowhere in the pleadings is there any allegation 
that a new negligence theory will be relied upon. Further, there 
were aduced no facts to support a negligence theory that Royal some-
how breached an alleged duty of due care of investigation concerning 
nondisclosed contractual obligations when they purchased the Company 
assets. Such an instruction is entirely outside the scope of the 
pleadings. Also, there is not one scintilla of evidence to suggest 
that Royal Industries could have done anything more than it did to 
become aware of the existing debts and obligations of the R. M. 
Evans & Company, when it acquired assets and named liabilities. 
(b) Again, the Court talks of "merger." However, 
the jury is left to divine how the "merger" could occur in law; such 
an instruction is an invitation for the jurors to speculate on what 
legal principles are to be applied to make such a finding. 
7. Instruction Number 36 
"In the event you find the evidence in favor 
of the plaintiff and against the defendants, 
you should calculate the number of EVANS EZY-
BOND PINCH ROLLER machines that have been 
manufactured by the defendants to date and 
award to the plaintiff a sum equal to two 
percent (2%) of the sale price of each machine. 
In the event the evidence shows that the said 
machines were sold for an amount less than 
$1,165.00 per machine, you should award the 
plaintiff damages equal to the two percent (2%) 
of said sum on those machines sold for a lesser 
price." 
Objections: 
(a) The undisputed testimony was tha t defendant, Ralph 
M. Evans, had personally manufactured nothing. (See Admission of 
P la in t i f f -Mul l ins Supra at P. 19.) This ins t ruc t ion again emphasi-
zes the Court fs erroneous lumping of the defendants in to one e n t i t y , 
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thus inviting a judgment against the individual, Ralph M. Evans. 
(b) There was no evidence concerning the number of 
machines manufactured solely by Royal Industries Inc. This instruc-
tion calls for speculation as to number of machines manufactured 
by that organization. 
(c) The agreement dated April 11, 196 7 attached in 
"Appendix A", clearly states that the amount of any Royalty would be 
2% of $1,165 or $23.30; also, this fact was admitted by the plain-
tiff-Mullins. (See Quote Supra at P. 20.) There was no evidence 
of any other figure to be used and this instruction only tends to 
confuse and cloud an otherwise sufficiently complicated case. 
Further, it permitted counsel for Mullins to improperly argue that 
the royalty should be based on the retail sales price of approxi-
mately $2,000.00 and, thus, inviting the erroneous verdict of this 
appeal. 
8. Instruction Number 39 
"You are further instructed that if you find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that it 
was the intent of the parties, that is, Ralph 
M. Evans, and the corporation of which Mr. 
Evans was President, th^t the two percent (2%) 
commission agreement was to be binding on both 
Mr. Evans individually and the corporation of 
which he was President and, further, that in 
the event the machine was to be produced by 
third parties through authority of defendants, 
Ralph M. Evans and the corporation over which 
he was President, then you should find the 
issues in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendant Ralph M. Evans." 
Objections: 
(a) There was absolutely no evidence introduced to 
suggest that Mr. Evans personally agreed to pay anything. As pre-
viously outlined in some detail, the entire record demonstrates that 
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any royalty obligation was purely a corporate one. This instruc-
tion invites the jury to speculate and find personal liability 
against Mr. Evans. 
(b) The instruction makes no distinction between 
the Arizona corporations of which Mr. Evans was President, when the 
2% commission agreement was negotiated, and the defendant corpora-
tion, Royal Industries, of which Mr. Evans later became a division 
President. The Court's failure to distinguish the parties again 
leads the jury into confusion. The free use of the word "corpora-
tion" when coupled with the other instructions, which merger identi-
ties, is clearly confusing and prejudicial. 
9. Instruction Number 41 
"You are further instructed that knowledge 
or information acquired by an officer of a 
corporation or a managing director of a 
corporation in the course of the conduct of 
business is imputed to the corporation. 
Therefore, a person need not prove that all 
of the officers or directors of a corpora-
tion were aware of a business transaction. 
It is sufficient to show that in the conduct 
of the corporate affairs a managing director 
or officer had knowledge of certain business 
dealings. Such knowledge on the part of said 
officer is imputed to the corporation as 
though the entire corporation was fully aware 
of the transaction, after said person became 
an agent, officer, or director of the corpor-
ation." 
Objections: 
(a) Like the objection to instruction Number 34 
Supra, the judge has created a new retroactive agency theory, 
whereunder an employer becomes responsible for the acts of his 
agents which occurred prior to employment. There is not one 
scintilla of evidence to suggest that after Mr. Evans became an 
agent of Royal Industries during the time that he had any contrac-
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t u a l d e a l i n g s w i t h p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s ; r a t h e r , t h e c o m p l e t e c o n t r a r y 
i s t r u e . A l l o f p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s 1 c l a i m s a r o s e on a l l e g e d e v e n t s 
which o c c u r r e d w h i l e Mr. Evans was a c t i n g as P r e s i d e n t of t h e two 
A r i z o n a q o r p o r a t i o n s , n o t p a r t i e s t o t h i s l i t i g a t i o n . T h i s i n s t r u c -
t i o n a g a i n compounds t h e p r e v i o u s e r r o r s and a g a i n mixes d e f e n d a n t s . 
The i n s t r u c t i o n s u g g e s t s t h a t Royal I n d u s t r i e s i s l i a b l e , u n d e r 
c o n t r a c t , f o r t h e a c t s of Mr. Evans y e a r s b e f o r e he was even 
employed by them. 
B . REQUESTED BUT UNGIVEN INSTRUCTIONS 
The e r r o r s above e n n u m e r a t e d were f u r t h e r compounded by 
t h e C o u r t r e f u s i n g t o g i v e i n s t r u c t i o n s r e q u e s t e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t -
a p p e l l a n t s . W i t h o u t e n n u m e r a t i n g a l l of them, some s i g n i f i c a n t ones 
a r e l i s t e d as f o l l o w s : 
1. Ins t ruc t ion Number 19 
"You are instructed that officers of a 
corporation are not personally liable 
for acts performed, including agreements 
entered into, on behalf of the corpora-
tion except in certain circumstances not 
in issue in this lawsuit." 
The failure of the Court to render this instruction per-
mitted the jury to confuse the individual corporations and to 
allow it to speculate and render a judgment against Ralph M. Evans, 
as an individual, for liabilities incurred by the corporate entity. 
2. Ins t ruc t ion Number 29 
"You are in s t ruc ted t h a t , as a matter of law, 
the evidence does not support P l a i n t i f f ' s 
claim tha t the Defendant, Ralph M. Evans, as 
an ind iv idua l , had entered in to a contract 
with P l a i n t i f f to pay P l a i n t i f f a 2% commis-
sion on pinch r o l l e r machines manufactured 
by Ralph M. Evans and you may not , t he re fo re , 
find for the P l a i n t i f f and against the Defen-
dant Ralph M. Evans." 
S e e d i S C U S S i o n o f t h i s s n h i p r f Pninf - T Q n n r a 
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3. Ins t ruc t ion Number 31 
"You are in s t ruc ted t h a t , as a matter of 
law, the evidence does not support P la in -
t i f f ' s claim tha t the Defendant, Royal 
Indus t r i e s , Inc. had knowingly assumed 
l i a b i l i t y for the obl igat ion of Ralph 
Evans Manufacturing Co. t o the P l a i n t i f f 
to pay a 2% commission on p inch- ro l l e r 
machines manufactured by Ralph Evans 
manufacturing Co." 
For the c lear and unrebutted evidence supporting th i s 
point , see Point I I Supra. 
4. Ins t ruc t ion Number 33 
(Quoted in ful l in Appendix) 
Objections; 
(a) This i n s t ruc t ion accurately s t a t e s the law of 
contract which requires the person seeking enforcement to be free 
of subs tan t i a l defau l t . See 7 Am. Jur . Pleading and Prac t ice Forms 
(Rev. Ed.) Form 101, p. 366; 17 Am. Jur . "Contracts" §365 at p . 807, 
§ 425-430 at p . 880. Also, i t se ts forth defendants r igh ts each to 
be t r i e d separately as dis t inguished from being lumped together as 
was done by the Court, compounding the confusion of i den t i t y problems. 
5. Ins t ruc t ion Number 34 
(See Appendix for fu l l Quote) 
Objection: 
(a) This ins t ruc t ion would again help c lar i fy the 
j u r y ' s mind tha t before a "commission" was due from Mr. Evans as 
an indiv idual , he must have produced the machine upon which com-
mission payments were claimed due or otherwise received some con-
s idera t ion to be l i a b l e for the debts of another. 
6. Ins t ruc t ion Number 41 
"You are instructed that if you find that 
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on pinch roller machines which was intended 
as compensation for any design ideas which 
were not new or novel you will find for the 
said Ralph M. Evans and against the Plaintiff, 
no cause of action. 
The law of contracts requires that there be legal consid-
eration exchanged. Under the facts of this contract dispute, 
plaintiff-Mullins claims to have proprietary rights in the machine 
for the consideration of the royalty payment obligation. The 
failure to give this instruction, allows the jury to award damages 
where no benefit was conferred to support a contract obligation 
against Mr. Evans, personally. 
This same objection also applies to requested instruction 
number 42, which (in fact) was a signatory on the memorandum agree-
ment. Thus, the Court effectively excluded the jury from being 
instructed on the "consideration"aspect of this case. 
7. Requested Instructions 45 and 46 
(Quoted in full in Appendix) 
Both of these in s t ruc t ions properly s t a t e the law which 
permits r esc i s s ion of a contract for breach. There was no adequate 
explanation to the jury of t h i s r i gh t to rescind on the grounds of 
subs t an t i a l nonperformance or breach of con t rac t . (See 17 Am. J u r . 
2d "Contracts" §484, 504.) Under the defendants1 theory of the 
case, the defendant had designed a square shaft machine which was 
unworkable and which contract was terminated August 23, 196 8. (See 
Statement of Fact No. 20.) The jury never was adequately ins t ruc ted 
on the r igh t of one to rescind for a p r io r material breach by 
p l a in t i f f -Mul l in s . 
8. Requested Ins t ruc t ion Number 49 
"You are ins t ruc ted tha t i f you find that the 
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agreement with Plaintiff for the payment 
of commission on pinch roller machines 
to be manufactured by Evans, and if you 
also find that Ralph Evans Manufacturing 
Co, entered into a written agreement to 
pay Plaintiff a 2% commission on pinch 
roller machines to be manufactured by 
Ralph Evans Manufacturing Co., you will 
find for Ralph M. Evans and against the 
Plaintiff if you find that the written 
agreement with Ralph Evans Manufacturing 
Co. was intended to replace the oral agree-
ment with Ralph M. Evans." 
Objections: 
(a) This refusal in conjunction with the other refus-
als concerning the al leged "oral agreement" compounded the confus-
ion concerning o ra l and wr i t ten con t rac t s . This refusal allowed 
the jury to speculate concerning oral discussions between the 
Pla in t i f f -Mul l ins and the defendant-Evans as an individual which 
were superceeded by the wri t ing of April 11, 1967. 
9. Requested Ins t ruc t ion Number 63 
"If you find tha t Ralph M. Evans was not 
employed by, an agent for, or a d i r ec to r , 
o f f i ce r , or manager of, Royal Indus t r i e s , 
Inc . a t the time that Royal Indus t r i e s , 
Inc . acquired the assets of Ralph Evans 
Manufacturing Company and R. M. Evans and 
Company, you are ins t ruc ted tha t the said 
Ralph M. Evans could not have been acting 
for Royal Indus t r i e s , Inc . in respect to the 
acquis i t ion of said a s s e t s . " 
Obj ec t ions : 
(a) This refusal concerning the proper explanation 
of agency principles again was compounded by the actual instructions 
of the Court, which improperly imposed vicarious liability upon an 
employer for acts done prior to the date of employment. 
10. Requested Instruction Number 66 
"If you find that the Plaintiff was ini-
tially employed by either Ralph M. Evans, 
Ralph Evans Manufacturing Company or R. M. 
Evans and Company to manufacture pinch 
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roller machines and that Plaintiff was 
also hired to solve the problem as to 
how said machines should be designed and 
constructed in order to (1) incorporate a 
safety device and (2) perform the function 
for which said machine was intended, you 
are instructed that any novel or original 
designs or inventions developed by the 
Plaintiff in the course of said employment 
are the property of the employer Ralph M. 
Evans, Ralph Evans Manufacturing Company 
or R. M. Evans and Company, depending on 
which one you find to be the employer." 
Denial of this instruction prevented the defendant-appel-
lants' theory of being adequately presented to the jury. There was 
an issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff had developed any idea 
for which compensation was possible or whether he had been employed 
on an hourly basis to develop the machine and, thereafter, to manu-
facture them at a fixed cost per copy. The refusal of this instruc-
tion denies the opportunity of the jury to consider the defendants1 
position. Certainly, these parties, on the evidence advanced, were 
entitled to have an instruction concerning a lack of consideration; 
thus, no commission payment was legally due because the underlying 
contract was void. 
POINT IV 
THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES SUBMITTED TO THE JURY WERE 
INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL 
VERDICT RENDERED; THEREFORE, THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANTS A NEW TRIAL. 
Rule 49(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly 
provides direction concerning inconsistent jury answers to interrog-
atories on a general verdict. These rules provide: 
"When the answers (jury answers to interroga-
tories) are inconsistent with each other and 
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one or more is likewise inconsistent with 
the general verdict, judgment shall not be 
entered, but the Court shall return the 
jury for further consideration of its answers 
and the verdict, or shall order a new trial," 
Rule 49(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(emphasis added) 
This Rule was specifically amended to change the old permissive 
language of "may" to the mandatory "shall." 
However, even before that language amendment in October, 
X965, this Court made it clear that it was not acceptable for the 
jury tq indicate that it believed two inconsistent and irreconcil-
able facts, In reversing lower court refusal to grant a new trial 
on the grounds that special interrogatories were inconsistent, this 
Court succinctly stated: 
"The answers given by the jury and their ver-
dict point out clearly, and amplify, the incon-
sistency. We believe that this situation is 
one contemplated by Rule 49(b), U.R.C.P. and 
that the trial court erred in denying the motion 
for a new trial." Schweitzer v. Stone, et. al., 
13 Ut. 2d 199, 371 P.2d 201, 204 (1962) (emphasis 
added); See also, Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District v. Nelson, 11 Ut. 2d 253, 358 P.2d 81 
(1960); Milligan v. Capital Furniture Co., 8 Ut. 
383, 335 P.2d 619 (1959). 
The following illustrate the inconsistent answers to 
special interrogatories returned by the jury. Because the jury 
returned after midnight, and because the trial judge was in the 
hospital, and unable to evaluate them with the evidence presented, 
they were not resubmitted to the jury by the substitute judge. 
Rather, counsel stipulated that all issues of error were reserved 
for a motion for new trial and consideration by the trial judge 
when he w<=is able. (A-312, 314.) 
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2 4 . Was P l a i n t i f f Walter Mullins paid by 
Ralph Evans personally? 
yes 
no X 
undecided 
"25. Was P l a i n t i f f Walter Mullins paid by 
a corporation? 
yes X 
no 
undecided 
"26. Was P l a i n t i f f Walter Mullins providing 
services in developing or cons t ruc t -
ing the pinch r o l l e r machine for a 
corporation known as the Ralph Evans 
Manufacturing Company, Inc.? 
yes X 
no 
undecided 
"2 7. Was P l a i n t i f f Walter Mullins providing 
services in developing or construct ing 
the pinch r o l l e r machine for Ralph 
Evans as an individual? 
yes X 
no 
undecided 
(Jury Answers to I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , A-563.) 
Thus, the jury found tha t the p la in t i f f - respondent was never paid 
by Mr. Evans personal ly . Rather, he worked for and was paid by a 
corporate e n t i t y . However, at the same time, i ncons i s t en t ly , they 
then find tha t p la in t i f f -Mul l ins was providing services for Ralph 
Evans as an individual on the same machine. 
This inconsistency i s further underscored by t h e i r answer 
to i n t e r roga to r i e s numbers 1 and 30. These questions were answered 
as follows: 
"30. When Ralph Evans discussed cer ta in pay-
ments to be made to P l a i n t i f f Walter 
Mullins on or about March 24, 196 7, was 
i t the understanding of both pa r t i e s to 
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the conversation that Mr. Evans was 
personally agreeing to make the pay-
ments? 
yes 
no X 
undecided 
"1. Was there a contract entered into 
between Ralph Evans, personally, as 
an individual, and the Plaintiff, 
Walter Mullins, whereunder the said 
Ralph Evans agreed personally to pay 
the Plaintiff 2% of the sales price of 
the EZY-BOND pinch roller name' by the 
R. M. Evans Manufacturing Company, Inc. 
yes X 
no 
undecided 
(Jury Answers A-56 4, 557) 
Therefore, the jury has now found that Ralph Evans personally enter-
ed into a contract and at the same time has found that he did not 
enter into a contract. Further, the Court has referred to "Appendix 
A" which clearly shows that the only evidence before the jury was 
a letter agreement dated April 11, 1967 for the payment of a 2% 
"commission." These answers to interrogatories are not only inter-
nally inconsistent, but 30 is inconsistent with the verdict rendered 
against Mr. Evans, personally. 
The foregoing inconsistency is compounded by the obvioys 
difficulty the jury had with the principal of agency. This confus-
ion is explainable by the erroneous instructions given by the Court 
as above explained; however, the problem is evident from the jury 
answers to interrogatories 2 8 and 29. They read as follows: 
"2 8. When Ralph Evans discussed certain pay-
ments to be made to Plaintiff Walter 
Mullins on or about March 24, 196 7, was 
he acting solely in his capacity as a 
President of a corporation and if so, did 
Plaintiff Walter Mullins understand that 
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fact or would a reasonable man have 
under the circumstances understood 
that Mr. Evans was acting only on 
behalf of a corporation? 
yes 
no 
undecided X 
"29. When Ralph Evans discussed certain pay-
ments to be made to Plaintiff Walter 
Mullins on or about March 24, 196 7, did 
Plaintiff Walter Mullins understand Mr. 
Evans was acting solely in his capacity 
as an officer of a corporation? 
yes 
no X 
undecided 
(Jury Answers to I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , A-56 4.) 
The jury has thus admitted tha t i t was undecided whether Ralph M. 
Evans, as an indiv idual , was act ing as the Pres ident of a corpora-
t ion when he executed the April 11, 1967 l e t t e r of memorandum agree-
ment; further^ i t was undecided as t o whether tha t fact was under-
stood by the p l a in t i f f -Mul l i n s . The glar ing inconsistency of such 
a finding at the same time a verdic t against Mr. Evans, personal ly , 
i s apparent. 
I t i s to be noted tha t i f Mr. Evans was act ing sole ly in 
h i s capacity as Pres ident , there obviously can be no personal l i a -
b i l i t y for a contract executed on behalf of tha t corporat ion. If, 
on the other hand, the pa r t i e s did not have a meeting of the minds 
on t ha t i s sue , there was no contract which could be enforced under 
general contract p r i n c i p l e s . Clear ly , under these answers, there 
was no finding by the jury to support a verd ic t against Mr. Evans, 
as an ind iv idua l . 
In terrogatory Number 43 provided: 
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"43, Did Royal Industries, Inc. knowingly 
agree to assume and fulfill the terms 
of a letter memorandum dated April 11, 
1967? 
yes 
no X 
undecided 
(Jury Answers to Interrogatories, A-56 7-56 8) 
Under the law discussed in Point III Supra at P. 30, no verdict 
could be rendered against Royal Industries without a finding that 
they assumed that contract or that there was a merger. Thus, 
answering this interrogatory "no" required the verdict against 
Royal Industries to be dismissed, absent a factual determination 
of the merger issue. 
It is respectfully submitted that the internal inconsis-
tency of the Answers to Interrogatories by the jury and their incon-
sistency with the verdict as rendered, requires that a new tr ial be 
awarded. The denial of defendant-appellants f r e q u e s t f o r a new 
t r i a l was c l e a r l y an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . 
POINT V 
THE LETTER OF AUGUST 2 3 , 196 8, THE CHECK TENDERED THERE-
WITH, AND PLAINTIFF-MULLINS' ACCEPTANCE THEREOF, CONSTITUTED AN 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION OR A RELEASE OF ANY OBLIGATION? THERETOFORE, 
ANY EXISTING ALLEGATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS TERMINATED. 
As i s more p a r t i c u l a r l y s e t f o r t h i n t h e F i n d i n g s of F a c t , 
t h e p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s d e s i g n e d a machine i n c o r p o r a t i n g a s q u a r e 
s h a f t c o n c e p t , which p r o v e d unworkab le and had t o be s c r a p p e d com-
p l e t e l y i n May o f 1968. P l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s a c c e p t e d t h e r e s p o n s i b i l -
i t y f o r t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h e s q u a r e s h a f t machine and t h e d e d u c -
t i o n of any payment a l l e g e d l y due f o r 31 of t h e d e f e c t i v e m a c h i n e s . 
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On August 23, 1968 the Ralph M. Evans Manufacturing Co. 
I n c . , by i t s Pres ident , wrote Mr. Mullins a l e t t e r offer ing a 
compromise set t lement of h i s claims and gave not ice t ha t the cor-
porat ion was no longer manufacturing a square shaft machine. The 
l e t t e r s t a t ed in pa r t : 
"The EZY-BOND pinch r o l l e r has undergone consider-
able changes. The square shaf t proved most under-
sa t i s f ac to ry and several o ther severe changes in the 
overa l l machine were necessary for dependable pro-
duct ion." 
"Subcontract costs on t h i s machine as well as the 
EZY-form had been and are present ly about one half 
of what they were before moving the factory to 
Glendale. I honestly f ee l , Walt, that you have been 
well paid for any design and development e f for t s tha t 
you have put in to the EZY-BOND and do not feel fur-
the r payment to you on t h i s machine i s j u s t i f i e d . 
Therefore, ef fect ive May 1, 1968 we wi l l no longer 
pay you commission on the EZY-BOND manufactured." 
(See Appendix "B" attached) 
P r io r to sending t h i s l e t t e r , there had been a subs t an t i a l dispute 
and discussion concerning problems concerning the EZY-BOND square 
shaf t machine. Customer complaints had been forwarded and Mr. 
Mullins had accepted r e spons ib i l i t y for a number of the machines 
which were defect ive . (See Statement of Facts 19-20.) S ign i f i can t ly , 
Mr. Mullins t e s t i f i e d t ha t he received the l e t t e r quoted above, 
understood and read the same p r io r to negot ia t ing the check which 
accompanied i t . (Statement of Fact No. 21.) 
This Court has observed: 
" . . . (W)here ' the money i s advanced by a t h i r d 
party and accepted by the c red i to r in s a t i s f a c -
t ion of a debt, i t i s a good accord and s a t i s f a c -
t ion ; that by ge t t ing such payment, the payee 
received something he might not otherwise have 
received, and t h i s cons t i tu ted a benef i t to him 
such as would be suf f ic ien t considerat ion to 
support the accord and s a t i s f a c t i o n . " Badger & 
Co. v. F ide l i ty Bldg. and Loan Ass 'n . , 9 4 Ut. 9 7, 
95 P.2d 669, 677 (1938) . 
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I t i s r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h e a c c e p t a n c e of t h i s 
c h e c k , t e n d e r e d as f u l l payment t o t h e p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s , was an 
a c c o r d and s a t i s f a c t i o n of a l l c l a i m s under t h e a l l e g e d a g r e e m e n t . 
He was on n o t i c e t h a t a new t y p e machine was b e i n g m a n u f a c t u r e d 
and made no o b j e c t i o n t o t h a t t e n d e r , u n t i l s u b s e q u e n t t o t h e d a t e 
payment had been r e c e i v e d and t h e check n e g o t i a t e d by h im. Thus , 
p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m was e x t i n g u i s h e d as of Augus t 2 3 , 1 9 6 8 . T h e r e i s 
no b a s i s f o r h i s c l a i m i n t h e w i t h i n a c t i o n and t h e Lower Cour t 
e r r e d i n n o t d i s m i s s i n g p l a i n t i f f ' s c a s e as a m a t t e r of l aw. 
POINT VI 
THERE WAS NO EXCHANGE OF CONSIDERATION TO SUPPORT THE 
APRIL 1 1 , 196 7 MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT; THEREFORE, IT IS VOID AND NO 
RECOVERY MAY BE GRANTED UNDER I T . 
P l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s ' own w i t n e s s e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e 
" s a f e t y " g a t e o r l i f t i n g mechanism was n o t new o r n o v e l ; r a t h e r , i t 
was a p a r t of t h e p u b l i c domain . In f a c t , i t had been i n v e n t e d and 
p a t e n t e d as of F e b r u a r y 1 8 , 1958 . Once t h e p a t e n t e x p i r e s , an i d e a 
becomes a p a r t of t h e p u b l i c domain and anyone i s f r e e t o u s e i t 
w i t h o u t f e e . F u r t h e r , t h e p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s a d m i t t e d t h a t he d i d n ' t 
e n g i n e e r o r d e s i g n t h e machine f e a t u r e s . ( S t a t e m e n t of F a c t Nos . 
16 , 1 7 , & 18 . ) I n a d d i t i o n , p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e s e g -
mented r o l l e r c o n c e p t was n o t h i s i d e a ; r a t h e r , t h a t i d e a was 
b r o u g h t t o him by Mr. E v a n s , who i n t u r n o b t a i n e d i t from Mr. B r i n k -
man, u n d e r whose a s s i g n m e n t of p a t e n t t h e mach ine was m a n u f a c t u r e d . 
( S t a t e m e n t of F a c t No. 17 . ) 
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e f o r e g o i n g , i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e 
two p e r c e n t commission a r r a n g e m e n t was n e g o t i a t e d on o r a b o u t March 
2 4 , 196 7 when p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s r e f u s e d t o s u r r e n d e r p a r t i a l l y Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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completed machines, parts, jigs and dies needed to manufacture 
the machine. He demanded $10,000 cash as a condition precedent 
to him to surrendering these items, in order that their manufacture 
could be transferred to Arizona. (See Statement of Fact No. 13.) 
Importantly, it is without dispute that Mr. Mullins had been fully 
paid for his labor in developing the machine at the agreed hourly 
figure. Also, the building in which they were stored was rented in 
the name of and all payments made by the Ralph M. Evans Manufactur-
ing Company, an Arizona corporation and, all parts, supplies and 
other items were not paid by Mr. Mullins; rather, they were all 
paid by the Arizona corporate entity. (See Statement of Fact No. 
7-13.) 
One must then ask what consideration was received by the 
Manufacturing Company or Ralph Evans. Mr. Mullins had no novel or 
patentable idea to market, the preliminary design work had been 
completed, on a fixed fee basis, were fully paid. He had no claim 
to labor, material or overhead expenses in that they were all paid 
by the Arizona corporate entity. The pneumatic system of the 
safety gate had been drawn by Mr. Ralph Walker, a sales agent 
of industrial supply company. This company supplied all of the 
stock parts to construct that system and his compensation was paid 
by the Manufacturing corporation, when it paid for the parts and 
supplies ordered. Mr. Mullins was compensated for his time on an 
hourly basis. Further, the pneumatic circuit used was not unique 
or novel in any regards. (See testimony of Ralph Walker; R-779, 
782, Exhibit D-22, Figure 4; see also Statement of Fact No. 17.) 
In short, the Arizona corporations which negotiated the 
return of their own property received no benefits or consideration 
other than the return of their own property wrongfully detained. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The two p e r c e n t commiss ion p r o m i s e was made s o l e l y t o o b t a i n c u s -
t ody of t h e machine and p a r t s which were b e i n g w r o n g e f u l l y w i t h h e l d 
i n S a l t Lake by p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s . 
The law on c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s c l e a r and summarized as 
f o l l o w s : 
"The g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t a p r o m i s e t o do t h a t 
which t h e p r o m i s o r i s a l r e a d y l e g a l l y bound t o 
do , o r t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of an e x i s t i n g l e g a l 
o b l i g a t i o n , does n o t c o n s t i t u t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , 
o r s u f f i c i e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n , f o r a c o n t r a c t . . . . 
Doing o r p r o m i s i n g t o do t h a t which one i s 
a l r e a d y bound t o do i s n o t a l e g a l d e t r i m e n t , . . . 
I t h a s a c c o r d i n g l y been d e c i d e d t h a t a c o n t r a c t 
made by t h e owner i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n p o s s e s s i o n 
of p r o p e r t y which i s u n l a w f u l l y w i t h h e l d from 
him i s w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r a t i o n and v o i d . " Am. J u r . 
2d " C o n t r a c t s " §119 and c a s e s t h e r e i n c i t e d , 
( emphas i s added) 
I t i s , t h e r e f o r e f r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d t h a t as a m a t t e r 
o f law t h e d e f e n d a n t - a p p e l l a n t s , and each o f them, s h o u l d have been 
d i s m i s s e d from t h e a c t i o n . The a l l e g e d a g r e e m e n t c l a i m e d by t h e 
p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s was n o t s u p p o r t e d by a d e q u a t e l e g a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
POINT VII 
BY PLAINTIFF-MULLINS' OWN TESTIMONY, THE COMMISSIONS WERE 
NOT DUE AFTER THEY WERE MANUFACTURED BY A THIRD PARTY. 
The memorandum d a t e d A p r i l 1 1 , 1967 and t h e ag reement 
be tween t h e p a r t i e s i s u n d i s p u t e d w i t h r e g a r d t o i t s d u r a t i o n . I t 
was a d m i t t e d t h a t commiss ions would be p a i d o n l y so l o n g as t h e y 
were m a n u f a c t u r e d by t h e Ralph Mf Evans M a n u f a c t u r i n g Company, o r , 
v i e w i n g t h e e v i d e n c e most f a v o r a b l y t o p l a i n t i f f - M u l l i n s , by Ralph 
E v a n s , p e r s o n a l l y . T h e r e f o r e , t h e Cour t e r r e d i n r e n d e r i n g a v e r -
d i c t a g a i n s t Royal I n d u s t r i e s , and f o r any mach ines m a n u f a c t u r e d 
a f t e r December 3 1 , 196 8, t h e d a t e Royal I n d u s t r i e s p u r c h a s e d a s s e t s 
o f two A r i z o n a c p r p o r a t i o n s . Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The plaintiff admitted and stipulated that the two 
percent commission payment was only to be paid so long as the 
Ralph M. Evans Manufacturing Company made them. He stated under 
oath; 
"The agreement was that he would pay me two per-
cent of the selling price of the machine, as long 
as he manufactured them." (Testimony of Walter 
Mullins, R-597; A-104-105.) (emphasis added) 
He also admitted that Ralph Evans never manufactured anything per-
sonally; therefore, it is clear he was referring to the manufactur-
ing corporation. 
Further, the testimony is clear and undisputed that 
Royal Industries purchased the assets of the Ralph M. Evans Manu-
facturing Company on December 31, 196 8. Neither Mr. Evans nor the 
Ralph M. Evans Manufacturing Company has manufactured any of the 
machines since that date. 
Therefore, by plaintiff's own understanding of the terms 
of the alleged agreement between the parties, the agreement has 
been satisfied and terminated. Thus, it is respectfully submitted 
that the Court erred in permitting the jury to render a verdict 
against Royal Industries, and in particular, render any judgment 
against it or Mr. Evans for machines manufactured subsequent to 
December 31, 1968. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case: "Confusion now hath made its masterpiece." 
(Macbeth, Act II.) The incredible chain of events during the course 
of this trial, starting with long trial delays apparently caused by 
the ill health of the judge and capped by a family tragedy, resulted 
in what could be called a bizzare verdict. 
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This verdic t was rendered personally against a corpor-
ate Pres ident in the sum of $6,040.00 on an alleged wr i t ten corpor-
ate ob l iga t ion . The verd ic t also awarded $47,160 against a t h i r d -
par ty , s t ranger to the wr i t ten document/ a f te r i t had purchased 
named assets of tha t corporation and p a r t i a l l y paid for them by 
assuming spec i f i ca l ly named l i a b i l i t i e s , of which p l a in t i f f - r e spon -
den t ' s claim was not included. Fur ther , the t o t a l , verdic t exceeded 
by almost four (4) times the generous and imaginative computation 
p l a in t i f f - r e sponden t ' s able t r i a l counsel presented during his 
closing arguments. 
The verdic t was obviously excessive and awarded contrary 
to the undisputed evidence. Further , i t was so excessive as to 
demonstrate tha t i t was awarded under the influence of b i a s , p re -
judice and passion. In addi t ion , i t was computed on pure specula-
t ion and conecture, contrary to undisputed evidence es tab l i sh ing t ha t 
(at most) a commission of approximately $8,000 could be found due. 
This t r i a l ve rd ic t was based on incons is ten t and erroneous 
jury i n s t r u c t i o n s . Among many other e r r o r s , the t r i a l court created 
a new theory of agency t h a t makes an employer l i ab l e for the acts 
of employees occurring before employment. Also, the t r i a l judge 
took issues of fact concerning a corporate merger question from 
the jury; ye t , incons i s ten t ly had ins t ruc t ions allowing the jury to 
speculate that one corporation could "by implicat ion" assume debt 
of another, without informing the jury on the legal standards 
for such an assumption. More p re jud i c i a l l y , the t o t a l i t y of the 
ins t ruc t ions confusingly intertwined the two Arizona corporat ions, 
not p a r t i e s to the s u i t , and these two defendant-appellants in such 
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a manner as t o deprive them of a hearing on t h e i r individual de-
fenses to the charges against them. 
In addi t ion , the answers to jury i n t e r roga to r i e s were 
incons i s ten t with one another and the verdic t i t s e l f . They demon-
s t r a t e d t h a t the delay and confusion caused by the death in the 
Judge's family and his hosp i t a l i z a t i on f a t a l l y wounded t h i s j u d i c i a l 
proceeding. 
Other e r r o r s , include the i n v a l i d i t y of the underlying -
wr i t ing r e l i e d upon by p la in t i f f - r e sponden t , and the Court 's re fus-
al to properly present defendants ' theor ies to the ju ry . However, 
without belaboring the innumerable p re jud ic ia l e r r o r s , t h i s case 
must be reversed with in s t ruc t ions t o dismiss the defendant-appel-
l a n t s . At a minimum, a new t r i a l must be awarded to preserve 
Utah's reputa t ion for fa i rness and i t s concern for due process of 
law, even against two non-residents of the S t a t e . 
Respectfully submitted, 
Lynn G. Foster 
Roger F. Cut ler 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellants 
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August 23, 1968 
Mr. Walter MulI ins 
594 E. 6270 S, 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Dear Walt;
 # 
Enclosed you will find our check in the amount of 
$1182.78. This check represents the following: 
payment on EZY-BOND machines per your letter* 
52 @ $23.30 ea. * $1211.60 
(83 less 31 defective) ' ~ - : 
\S% commission on net profits of 
RALPH EVANS MFG. CO.,INC. to 
March 31, 1967 389.80 
($8504.57 net profit -- payment 
for II months) ^ 
$1601.40 
Less moving expenses for L.MulIins 418.62 
Total due $1182.78. 
The EZY-B0ND pinch roller has undergone considerable 
changes. The square shaft proved most unsatisfactory 
and several other severe changes in the overall machine 
were necessary for dependable production. 
Subcontract costs on this machine as welt as the 
EZY-F0RM have been and are presently about one half 
what they were before moving the factory to Glendale. 
I honestly feel, Walt, that you have been well paid for 
any design and development efforts that you put into the 
EZY-B0ND and do not feel further payment to you on this 
machine is justified. Therefore, effective May I, 1968 
we will no longer pay you commission on each EZY-B0ND 
manufactured. 
Very trujy yours, 
R. M. EVANS & COMPANY, INC. 
Ralph M. Evans 
President Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
April 11, 1967 
•> 1 
•• Mr. Walter Kullins • \ . . 
• 594 East 6270 South ', • . '. • • • 
'. Hurray, Utah ..''..•'• 
. Dear Walt: 
In roforence to our conversation' of March-24, 19&7 regarding ' 
your commissions on the EVANS EZY-BOMD pinch roller sales. 
• .As agreed, we fdll pay you a two-percent (2%) commission on 
/all EVANS EZY-BOND pinch rollers manufactured in Glcndale, 
•* Arizona. This commission to be based on the Mfg. Co. sale' 
price of the pinch roller or $1,165^00 per machine. Said 
commissions to be paid to you each month beginning^with pinch 
rollers manufactured after April 1, 1967 • • • 
In reference to -the five-percent (5%) commission to be paid 
.. to you on the net profits of Ralph Evans Manufacturing Company/ 
{ Inc. for fehe poriod ending March 31, 196?. The net profits 
'will be computed and finalised sometime in.the month of April 
1967. You will be notified of this amount at the earliest 
.'.possible date and the amount due will be paid to you during 
- the first quarter of the calendar year 1968. . r" 
I trust that you will find the above in accordance with our 
% verbal Agreements on these items. 
V •'.-. ; 0 •. <\ ••:*•'..• • "\ . Very truly yours^ . 
7 '•'•••/' .. R, M. E7ANS £ CO., INC. ' '' 
Ralph M. Evan3 
President 
Rffi/ph '% 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 30 
It is the contention of the plaintiff that R. M. Evans & 
Company, Inc., and thereafter Royal Industries Corporation, 
Inc. by written agreement had agreed to pay to the plain-
tiff a two per cent (2%) commission on all EVANS EZY-BOND 
pinch roller machines manufactured after April 1, 196 7. 
Therefore, if you find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that such an agreement was entered into, then you should 
determine from the evidence how many of such machines were 
manufactured by the defendants since said date and award 
damages to the plaintiff pursuant to the said agreement or 
agreements. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3 3 
You are instructed that in order for Plaintiff to 
be entitled to recover from the Defendant Ralph M. Evans 
upon an oral contract to pay a commission of 2% on pinch 
roller machines to be manufactured by Ralph M. Evans, 
you must find by a preponderance of the evidence, each of 
the following: 
(1) Ralph M. Evans promised to pay Plaintiff 
a 2% commission on all pinch roller machines to be manufac-
tured by Ralph M. Evans personally, and 
(2) Ralph M. Evans acted for himself as an indi-
vidual and not as an agent or representative for R. M. Evans 
and Company or for Ralph Evans Manufacturing Company, and 
(3) Plaintiff gave to Ralph M. Evans legal con-
sideration, as this term is defined for you in instruction 
No.^ , in exchange for said promise to pay said commission, 
and 
(4) Plaintiff had not breached any of the terms of 
said Agreement including those terms pertaining to an express 
or implied warranty of merchantability or an express or implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, as such terms 
are explained to you in Instructions No. and , and 
(5) Ralph M. Evans unjustifiably breached any such 
agreement, and 
(6) The amount of damages sustained as a result 
of said breach, if any. 
If any of these elements are not proved by Plaintiff 
by a preponderance of the evidence, you are instructed to find 
for the Defendant Ralph M. Evans and against the Plaintiff, 
no cause of action. If you find that each exists, you are 
instructed to determine if there was a valid rescission or an 
Accord and Satisfaction as hereafter explained to you before 
determining damages, if any. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3 4 
You are instructed that if you find that all of 
the elements of a contract existed between Plaintiff and 
Ralph M. Evans, as an individual, before you can find for 
the Plaintiff, you must also find that Ralph M. Evans 
breached said agreement. 
In order to find that the said Ralph M. Evans 
breached said agreement you must find that he had: 
(1) Manufactured pinch roller machines as an 
individual and not as. a representative of R. M. Evans and 
Co. or Ralph Evans Manufacturing Co., and 
(2) Unjustifiably failed to pay a commission to 
the Plaintiff. You are instructed that if there was a valid 
rescission as explained in Instruction No. or an Accord 
and Satisfaction as explained in Instruction No. _, the 
failure to pay would be legally jus t i f ied . 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 45 
You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i f you f ind t h a t the P l a i n t i f f 
e n t e r e d i n t o a w r i t t e n agreement with Ralph Evans Manufactur-
ing Co. for t h e payment of a 2% commission on pinch r o l l e r 
machines t o be manufactured by Ralph Evans Manufacturing Co. 
and t h a t s a i d commission was t o be pa id for P l a i n t i f f ' s design 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o s a i d pinch r o l l e r machine you w i l l , neve r -
t h e l e s s , f ind for the Defendant Royal I n d u s t r i e s , I n c . and 
a g a i n s t the P l a i n t i f f i f you f ind (1) t h a t the square s h a f t 
was a des ign c o n t r i b u t i o n of the P l a i n t i f f , (2) t h a t the 
machines which u t i l i z e d s a i d square s h a f t was no t marke tab le 
u n t i l r e - b u i l t / wi th a round s h a f t and (3) t h a t Ralph Evans 
Manufacturing Co. t e rmina ted s a i d agreement because of the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s wi th t h e square s h a f t . 
FVWTRTT F 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 46 
If you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence: 
(1) That the Plaintiff entered into a legally 
binding contract with either Ralph M. Evans or Ralph Evans 
Manufacturing Co., and 
(2) That Plaintiff gave a warranty of merchant-
ability or a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose 
as those terms have been explained to you, and 
(3) That Plaintiff has breached either of said 
warranties, 
You are instructed that the Defendant Ralph M. 
Evans or Ralph Evans Manufacturing Co., or its agent, 
may rescind or terminate said agreement upon that ground 
and if you find that the said Ralph M. Evans or Ralph Evans 
Manufacturing Co. notified Plaintiff that said agreement 
was being terminated on that ground you will find for the 
Defendants and against the Plaintiff, no cause of action. 
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